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The Republic can no more live without its supreme law duly obeyed
or duly enforced than can its citizens who compose it live without air.
-Congressman John Bingham'
I. INTRODUCTION
Boston Harbor, Philadelphia's Independence Hall, Washington, D.C., and the
fields of Gettysburg: all these locations have earned their place in constitutional
history as high-water marks of popular and national sovereignty. But in order to
understand the relationship between the nation and its constituent states today,
lawyers and scholars must also look to a place less well studied than
Philadelphia, less evocative than Gettysburg: nineteenth century Charleston,
South Carolina. In the cauldron of Charleston Harbor, conflicting visions of
sovereignty simmered, and eventually boiled over. The competing conceptions of
state sovereignty that emerged continue to shape the contours of national power.
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention had previously attempted an
innovative solution to the dilemma of balancing state and national authority:
ultimate sovereignty would rest in the hands of the people, with immediate
sovereignty divided between state and national governments. Long after the ink
had dried on the framers' signatures, several key episodes fundamentally
challenged the founders' compromise. First, South Carolina authorities defied
federal law in 1823 when they arrested and jailed Harry Elkison, a black
Jamaican seaman aboard a British ship who had the misfortune to dock in
Charleston Harbor. Ten years later, South Carolina authorities ordered their
citizens to violate federal tariff laws on goods flowing into the Harbor, President
Andrew Jackson ordered military companies to fortify federal posts, and the
South Carolina governor countered by organizing a militia of 25,000 troops to
protect his state supremacy doctrine. Compromise in 1833 merely postponed the
inevitable confrontation, and on April 12, 1861, South Carolina troops fired the
first shots of the Civil War against Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. This series
of events eventually gave rise to the Fourteenth Amendment, which was intended
to resolve questions about sovereignty that had plagued prior generations.
These three episodes helped to shape the conception of federalism embodied
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.2 When the primary author of
1. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1862) (supporting the resupply of federal troops during the
Civil War). Congressman Bingham was the primary author of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Richard L.
Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36
AKRON L. REV. 589,590 (2003).
2. The three events chronicled in this article were not the only significant "constitutional crises" to occur
in the first century of United States history. The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 brought the federal government
into direct conflict with the command of the First Amendment, and spawned the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions in which two state governments urged defiance of the federal laws. See infra text accompanying
notes 162-75. For more extended discussion, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVILEGE:" STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52-116 (2000). The
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that Amendment referred to South Carolina in his final speech advocating
adoption, his congressional audience could not have mistaken the reference. 3 All
would have understood that the new Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibited
state defiance of national laws.
The lessons of Charleston, however, appear to have been forgotten. On May
28, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided that owners of a cruise ship
could not bring an action before the Federal Maritime Commission to complain
that the South Carolina Ports Authority violated federal anti-discrimination laws
by barring the ship from docking in Charleston Harbor.4 Five Supreme Court
justices relied on principles of state sovereign immunity to bar individuals from
enforcing the nation's supreme law in federal administrative proceedings.
Reading from the bench, Justice Breyer dissented, asking: "Where does the
Constitution contain the principle of law that the Court enunciates? ' 5 And
answering: "I cannot find the answer to this question in any text, in any tradition,
or in any relevant purpose."6
Neglect of South Carolinian history contributes to the confusion and conflict
that marks contemporary Supreme Court battles over the issue of federalism and
state sovereign immunity. Both the majority and the dissenters search in vain for
definitive guidance from framers of the Constitution. Writing for the majority,
Justice Thomas cited a "relatively barren historical record ' 7 and noted that the
"relevant history does not provide direct guidance." 8 He then leapt from
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment at the end of the eighteenth century to
the decision a century later in which the Court abandoned the text of that
amendment and chartered its own course on issues of state sovereign immunity. 9
Neither the majority nor the dissenters made any reference to the constitutional
reshaping of federalism that took place within the nineteenth century. In the
pages which follow, I will explain how answers to the justices' questions emerge
from a study of that history.
Cherokee Nation crises of the 1830's involved Georgia's defiance of federal law protecting Indian Nations. A
potential challenge to Supreme Court authority died with the determination that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
resolve the dispute. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). Although both the Alien and Sedition
Act and the Cherokee Nation dispute affected subsequent understandings [I've been converted to Judith's
terminology in which there are multiple "understandings" of federalism!] of federalism in the United States,
neither of those events were as closely tied to development of the Fourteenth Amendment as the episodes that I
focus upon in this article.
3. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 2542 (1866). See discussion infra text accompanying note 306.
4. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
5. Id. at 772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 755.
8. Id. See also Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which stated that "total 18th-century silence about
state immunity in Article I proceedings would argue against, not in favor of, immunity." Id. at 779 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
9. Id. (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)).
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I begin my analysis by focusing upon conceptions of sovereignty and
federalism that prevailed when the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment
were framed. Those conceptions precluded consideration of state sovereignty
within the sphere of congressional authority. In short, recent Supreme Court
decisions promoting state sovereignty rely upon a theory of federalism that did
not exist when delegates met in Philadelphia. At that time, "everyone"
understood the "plan of the convention"' 0 : that a transfer of sovereignty over
enumerated powers also eliminated state claims to sovereignty related to those
subject areas."
Limits in eighteenth century conceptions of sovereignty help to explain the
absence of debate over the issue of federal question jurisdiction at the time when
Congress promulgated the Eleventh Amendment. A relatively "barren" record,
however, stirs confusion without providing definitive answers. The comparative
lack of eighteenth century evidence merely provides a starting place for
understanding American federalism, because the real battles over this issue were
fought in the century that followed. The belief that state sovereignty retains force
even within the context of "supreme" federal authority arose as part of a defense
of slavery in the 1820s, and framed the classic debates in the 1830s between
Massachusetts Senator Daniel Webster and South Carolina Senators John C.
Calhoun and Robert Y. Hayne.1
2
By focusing attention on the history of Charleston Harbor, I will explain why
Congress sought to bury the pro-slavery conception of federalism, and how
recent Supreme Court decisions revived that conception. I will conclude by
discussing how nineteenth century lessons apply to development of a credible
twenty-first century framework for federalism.
A. Sovereignty and Federalism
Before I begin my historical narrative, it will help to distinguish between the
terms "sovereignty" and "federalism." Failure to make this distinction results in
confusion and may help to explain the underlying incoherence of recent "states'
rights" decisions of the Supreme Court.1 3 While federalism refers to a division of
government operations, the concept of sovereignty refers to final and exclusive
power in either an immediate or ultimate sense.14
10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. See infra notes 13-41 and accompanying text for the repeated explanations of Justice Brennan.
12. See infra notes 183-240 and accompanying text.
13. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1622-23 (2002)
(explaining that "key differences between the two terms relate to conclusions about ultimate control over policy
... concepts of federalism and state sovereignty have become confused because the modem champions of
states' rights on the Supreme Court themselves often seem confused about which concept they are advocating").
14. Id. at 1626-33. The difference between ultimate and immediate sovereignty can be understood in
terms of the assumption that, in a constitutional democracy, ultimate sovereignty remains with the people while
immediate sovereignty is vested in the government itself.
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The Articles of Confederation guaranteed that "each state retains its
sovereignty,"1 5 but the United States Constitution brought about a fundamental
change in this allocation of sovereign power. In marked contrast to the Articles of
Confederation, the main body of the Constitution makes no provision for state
sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment addressed that "defect" by assuring that
"powers not delegated to the United States ... nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."16  The Tenth
Amendment, however, merely confirmed a division of authority already implied
by the enumeration of powers in Article I of the Constitution. No record from the
framing era suggests that the central government lacked any attributes of
sovereignty while acting within its delegated powers, and those attributes were
understood to include exclusivity, finality and enforcement capability. 7 The idea
that states retain elements of sovereignty within the sphere of central authority
would have been tantamount to restoring the Articles of Confederation.' 8
Confusion regarding these issues may be traced in part to the broad language
used during the ratification debates that some mischaracterize as evidence of an
intent to protect state sovereign immunity even in the context of federal question
jurisdiction. This discussion covers terrain frequently plowed by participants in
Eleventh Amendment debates. 9 Advocates of a broad conception of state
15. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. n1.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. See Gey, supra note 13, at 1631 (noting that "a government entity can only be deemed 'sovereign'... if
that government's power to adopt policies in a given area is exclusive, if those policies are final, and if the
government has the authority to enforce the policies"); Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ.
1425 (1987) (explaining that at the time when the Constitution was framed, "the true sovereign-must necessarily
enjoy the essential attributes of indivisible, final and unlimited authority").
18. See Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, and Sovereign Immunity: On Alden's Return to
Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 647 (2001) (arguing that the Alden majority misconstrued
history and contradicted Framers' intent).
19. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1559 (2002) (presenting arguments that founders understood courts to lack only personal jurisdiction over
sovereign states); Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2002) (viewing
entrenched system of immunities as result of multiple, historical errors); Paul E. McGreal, Saving Article I from
Seminole Tribe: A View from the Federalist Papers, 55 SMU L. REV. 393 (2002) (arguing for a limited category of
cases that meet Hamilton's "plan of the convention" test); Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign
Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001) (defending sovereign immunity, even in the Fourteenth Amendment
context); Joan Meyler, A Matter of Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court's Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and Its Progeny, 45 How.
L.J. 77 (2001) (arguing that justices have misread or inappropriately deferred to comments of Hamilton, Madison
and Marshall); Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1113, 1118 (2001) (decrying protection of state sovereign immunity as "intellectually unfounded and unjust");
Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State
Sovereign Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1202 (2001) (declaiming sovereign immunity
as an antiquated concept that lacks historical or functional support); James F. Pfander, History and State Suability:
An "Explanatory Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (explaining that the
Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment reflected compromise establishing future national fiscal authority and
protecting states from liability for pre-existing debts); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989) (supporting congressional authority to abrogate state
immunity except where limited by Eleventh Amendment text); see also articles cited infra note 39.
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sovereign immunity cite the language of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison
and John Marshall to support their claims for state sovereign immunity even
within the context of federal authority. 20 For example, Hamilton wrote that "[ilt
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.' '21 During the Virginia Ratification Convention,
Madison argued that "[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any state into
court. ' '22 During the same debate, Marshall declared: "I hope that no gentleman
will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court .... It is not
,,23
rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.
Viewed in isolation, these statements appear to support claims that state
sovereign immunity survived the constitutional convention.2 4 Hamilton, Madison
and Marshall, however, all addressed the context of claims based upon diversity
jurisdiction regarding issues over which states had claims to sovereign
authority. 5 For example, the remainder of the paragraph in which Hamilton's
comment appeared addressed the "privilege [of state governments] of paying
their own debts in their own way .... ,26 Hamilton concluded that the
Constitution should not be construed to authorize "suits against States for the
debts they owe. 27 Within the same paragraph, Hamilton explained that the
protection of state sovereignty would not apply if "there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention. 2 8
Similarly, when James Madison and John Marshall defended the Constitution
during ratification debates by reassuring delegates to the Virginia Convention
that states would retain sovereign immunity, they did so only in reference to the
Diversity Clause, 29 and by implication, only within a context in which states
retained sovereignty. Furthermore, in the context of legitimate federal questions,
Madison and Marshall both recognized the final and exclusive nature of central
government authority.30 Madison explained this distinction by noting: "With
20. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 19, at 1592-93. Development of this argument appears in Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 10, at 487.
22. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
23. Id. at 555.
24. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999).
25. See Strasser, supra note 18, at 639-40.
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 10, at 488.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 487.
29. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890) (citing 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 533, 555 (2d ed. 1836)).
For additional explanation, see Strasser, supra note 18, at 639-40.
30. Madison explained that national jurisdiction extended to "certain enumerated objects" with the
boundary between national and state jurisdiction to be determined by the national government, concluding "in
the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245-46 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 164 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall recognized a
"general proposition" supporting state sovereign immunity, id. at 380, but explained that states had surrendered
that immunity as to matters where the Constitution transferred sovereignty to the national government. Id. at
380-82. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 762 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary and expedient that their
judicial power should correspond with the legislative, that it has not been
objected to."'"
In contrast to the positions of Hamilton, Madison and Marshall, Luther Martin
sought to preserve state sovereignty throughout the Constitutional Convention,
introducing the first draft of a "supremacy clause" that "pointedly failed to specify
the supremacy of the federal Constitution over its state counterparts."32 Martin did
not challenge the view of others that ultimate sovereignty was in the people,33 but
argued instead that sovereignty remained with the people of each state rather than
with the people of the nation.34 The Convention's repudiation of Martin's views
theoretically preempted any arguments that the new Constitution was a compact
among sovereign states rather than the establishment of a new sovereign subject
only to the ultimate sovereignty of the nation's people.
35
Claims for the survival of state sovereign immunity center upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.36 Both Chisholm and the Eleventh
Amendment which it spawned, however, reinforce a conception of separate state
and federal sovereignty. Georgia's explosive reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm is best understood in terms of federal encroachment into a
sphere of authority-state liability for debts-that did not appear within the
enumerated powers of Congress and, therefore, had not been surrendered to the
national government. The Eleventh Amendment that grew out of Chisholm
incorporated this same conception of separate sovereignty. 37 In the years that
31. 3 ELLIOrr'S DEBATES 532 (2d ed. 1836)).
32. Amar, supra note 17, at 1458 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 28-29
(M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
33. As noted by Amar, id. at 1452, ultimate sovereignty of the people seemed to be one principle that
"all republicans" and "all federalists" agreed on. Their debate was whether sovereignty rested in the people of
the state or the people of the union.
34. Id. at 1458.
35. Id.
36. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
37. The Eleventh Amendment provides that: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. By taking
away diversity jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment effectively barred the federal courts from exercising
sovereignty over a state within a sphere of continuing final state authority. A majority of current Supreme Court
justices argue that the Eleventh Amendment symbolized a more general principle of state sovereign immunity,
see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-730 (1999), but the decision not to capture that broad principle within
the text of the Amendment can not be explained by a simple lack of foresight. During the ratification debates,
participants proposed an amendment that "nothing in the Constitution now under consideration contained, is to
be construed to authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner whatever." Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 278 n.28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing debates in the New York Convention
recorded in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 409). The choice of narrow language limited to instances of diversity
jurisdiction, rather than broad language comparable to that previously proposed, provides evidence of an
intelligent choice, refuting claims that a broader principle would have been preferred if the authors had only
"thought about" the matter. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (asking if "Congress, when preparing
the Eleventh Amendment had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State
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followed, the Supreme Court's discussion of the relationship between state and
federal governments continued to reflect the "assumption that each government's
area of sovereignty would be exclusive and absolute.,
38
The only limits to federal sovereignty applicable to the range of responsibilities
delegated by the Constitution to the national government were those embodied by
the Bill of Rights. Participants in the ratification debates and early Supreme Court
justices never provided direct fuel for arguments that states retained elements of
sovereignty within the context of delegated central government power.39 Indeed,
the "very chief end" of the Constitution was to displace the ultimate state
sovereignty embodied by the Articles of Confederation.4 °
The belief that states retained sovereign immunity even in relationship to the
duly authorized exercise of federal power only makes sense if one assumes that,
when confronted with a challenge to federal law, states retained a preeminent
role. Arguments for that perspective have deep historical roots, but they will not
be found in the constitutional text, in the ratification debates, in the arguments
from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we
imagine that it would have been adopted by the StatesT'); see also Amar, supra note 17 at 1481 (noting that "If
the Eleventh Amendment's framers had intended a broad sovereign immunity principle applicable even in
federal question cases, they knew the words").
38. Gey, supra note 13, at 1610.
39. Justice Brennan made this point consistently during his tenure on the Court. See, e.g., Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (explaining that "States surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce" and quoting Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1824) that "[t]his power, like all others
vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the constitution"). Note that when the Parden decision was rendered, all of the
justices appeared to agree that Congress had the authority to impose liability on states when exercising power
pursuant to Article I of the Constitution. The dispute among the justices was over the question of whether
Congress needed to expressly abrogate state immunity, or whether, as Justice Brennan and the majority
concluded, waiver of immunity could be implied. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting)
(explaining that "the decision to impose such conditions is for Congress and not for the courts"). Writing for a
plurality of the justices in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Justice Brennan again explained "that, to the extent
that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where
Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable." 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989)
(concluding that Congress could authorize suits for monetary damages pursuant to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980). In his concurring opinion in Union Gas,
Justice Stevens noted that Brennan's explanations, along with that of "numerous scholars" had "exhaustively
and conclusively refuted the contention that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of sovereign
immunity to the States." Id. at 24 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of
the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Amar, supra note 17; Carol F. Lee,
Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAw. 519 (1986); David L.
Shapiro, Comment, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61
(1984); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976)).
40. THE GREAT DEBATE: HAYNE AND WEBSTER 205 (Lindsay Swift ed., 1898) (quoting Daniel Webster
in his Senate debate with Robert Y. Hayne) [hereinafter GREAT DEBATE].
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that gave rise to the Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,4' or in the
subsequent promulgation of the Eleventh Amendment. They originated instead in
desperate attempts to establish states' rights in order to preserve the institution of
slavery. The first detailed arguments that state sovereignty extended over the
powers granted to Congress by Article I of the Constitution arose in the 1820s in
and around the port of Charleston, South Carolina.
B. Introduction to Charleston
A conception of federalism that recognized state sovereignty within the
sphere of enumerated national powers originated in the unique political
environment of South Carolina. A brief introduction to the social and political
context in which states' rights doctrine originated illuminates this relationship.
Charleston, South Carolina, stood out from other American cities in the
1820's. William Freehling describes it as "the most English city in America"
with "enormous wealth and exquisite cultivation" that characterized "the
Carolina chivalry. '42 Frederic Bancroft notes that the "leisure or semi-leisure
class in South Carolina was relatively much larger than in any other state., 43 The
"carriages with coats of arms" and the "exclusive balls,"" however, could not
hide the rot of slavery from which Charleston society derived its wealth.
The political elite of South Carolina depended upon slavery more than any
other state. As described by Manisha Sinha, "slavery lay at the heart of a
relatively unified plantation economy presided over by a statewide planter class.
A majority of the population were slaves, and in no other state did the
nonplantation-belt yeomanry lie more at the fringes of slave society. 45 Lopsided
apportionment coupled with requirements that political office holders owned
either slaves or substantial amounts of property reinforced a "thoroughly
undemocratic" system of government.46 Carolinian "planter politicians" led their
state and guided the unique ideological stance of southern nationalism for which
the state became known.47
41. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
42. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA 1816-1836, at 1 (1966).
43. FREDERIC BANCROFT, CALHOUN AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA NULLIFICATION MOVEMENT 24 (1966).
44. FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 1.
45. MANISHA SINHA, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SLAVERY: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 9 (2000) (citing RACHEL N. KLEIN, UNIFICATION OF A SLAVE STATE: THE
RISE OF THE PLANTER CLASS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA BACKCOUNTRY 1760-1808 (1990); PETER H. WOOD,
BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION
(1974)).
46. Id. at 13. South Carolina retained property and slaveholding qualifications for political office and a
malapportioned legislature until Reconstruction. Id. at 14.
47. Id. at 5.
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A series of interwoven events helped shape the political hysteria of
antebellum South Carolina. As the slave population grew, so did fears of a slave
rebellion. Economic conditions also affected political ideology. A sharp decline
in the price of cotton followed the panic of 1819 and contributed to a period of
economic stagnation.48 Politicians who had previously identified themselves as
nationalists instead assumed the mantle of states' rights and railed against tariff
policies of the national government.49 Putting these pieces together, the national
tariff became portrayed as "an antislavery plot, '50 and southern slaveholders were
told to turn to their states in order to "protect themselves from a hostile
majority., 5 1
In the pages that follow, I will describe in more detail how events that took
place in and around Charleston Harbor helped shape the peculiar nineteenth
century conceptions of state sovereignty that became identified as the "South
Carolina Doctrine. 52 I have two reasons for focusing on this period of history.
First, I intend to illustrate the premise that the contemporary Supreme Court
majority's conception of state sovereignty is derived from the pro-slavery
arguments of the nineteenth century rather than from the generation of
constitutional founders. My second point is that framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly responded to that conception of state sovereignty with the
intent of putting it to rest. In other words, understanding the history of Charleston
Harbor-and the constitutional response to that history-fills a gap that the
Supreme Court left open in its most recent encounter with federalism and the
Charleston Port Authority.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES SURROUNDING CHARLESTON HARBOR
A. Seamen and Slaves
Two distinct, but interrelated, concerns motivated South Carolina's drive for
asserting state sovereignty. On one hand, the state's leaders feared national
interference with the institution of slavery, and on the other hand they feared the
slaves themselves. It was fear of their slaves that led to the decision to seize and
jail all seamen who arrived in the port of Charleston and who were not of
European ancestry. This law, the Negro Seamen's Act of 1822, marked the first
clear act of southern defiance of federal law.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 17 (citing Robert J. Turnbull, whose "Crisis essays" appeared in the Charleston Mercury).
51. Id. at 18.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
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1. Denmark Vesey and Fears of a Slave Rebellion
An African American named Denmark Vesey, who had purchased his
freedom with lottery winnings and subsequently prospered as a carpenter, set off
alarm bells in the city of Charleston.53 Vesey also preached at the newly
established Negroes' African Church which grew out of ties to Philadelphia's
African Methodist Society.54 He combined biblical authority with the text of the
Declaration of Independence to challenge the institution of slavery.55
Together with a cadre of assistants, Vesey made elaborate plans for a slave
rebellion in the city of Charleston. At the stroke of midnight on June 16, 1822,
six battle units were to lead a surprise attack, taking over unguarded Charleston
stables and arsenals and capturing key positions throughout the city. 56 In the days
before the planned attack, however, two prospective participants confessed their
plan to white authorities.57 Military companies under the command of then
Colonel Robert Y. Hayne went into action, and Vesey and his cohorts suspended
their plans.58 In the months that followed, South Carolina hanged thirty-five
African Americans and banished another thirty-seven from the state.59 It was
generally understood, however, that a much larger number of slaves stood ready
to participate in the uprising. In subsequent years, "Charleston had to live with
the distressing conviction that most rebels remained at large."6°
2. Harry Elkison and the Rise of State Sovereignty
The South Carolina legislature responded swiftly to the "Vesey Conspiracy,"
reacting in particular to fears of foreign "agitators.",6' Before the end of 1822, the
legislature enacted a law "for the better regulation of free negroes and persons of
color, and for other purposes. 62 The law provided for seizure and imprisonment
of all "persons of color" who arrived in South Carolina ports, subject to release
for departure when their ship's captain had paid for their expenses, and to be sold
into slavery if the captain failed to pay for their release.63 In January of 1823,
individuals were seized from both British and American ships, 64 inviting
53. FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 54.
54. Id. at 55.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 57-59.
57. Id. at 58-59.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 60 (noting that some members of the "conspiracy" refused to give the names of their
followers).
61. Id. at 112.
62. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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immediate conflict with the federal government.65 Protests from the British
government led to an admonition from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
and to an apparent suspension of the law.
66
In July 1823, however, the South Carolinians responded again, creating the
South Carolina Association, an "extralegal, law-enforcing organization of private
citizens" formed for the primary purpose of controlling the black population.67
The Association demanded enforcement of the seamen law, and authorities
seized and imprisoned Harry Elkison, a Jamaican on the British ship Homer
sailing from Liverpool.68 The British consul brought a petition for writ of habeas
corpus to United States Supreme Court Justice William Johnson, a Charleston
native,69 who heard the case while riding circuit. Representatives of the South
Carolina Association responded on behalf of the state.70
In his written opinion, Justice Johnson expressed displeasure with the actions
of his native state. He recounted the background of correspondence with the
Secretary of State, and his initial confidence that "the [Negro Seaman's] act had
been passed hastily, and without due consideration.' State authorities had been
informed of the "unconstitutionality and injurious effects upon our commerce
and foreign nations" caused by the South Carolina law.72 As described by Justice
Johnson, state officers had "shown every disposition to let it sleep, 73 and new
cases were being prosecuted only because of intervention by the South Carolina
Association. In Johnson's opinion, the South Carolina law was "altogether
irreconcilable with the powers of the general government.,
74
Representatives of the Association openly acknowledged the conflict
between the South Carolina law and the power of Congress to regulate
commerce. According to one representative, "South Carolina was a sovereign
state when she adopted the constitution; a sovereign state cannot surrender a right
of vital importance ... she is herself the sovereign judge. 75 Another lawyer for
the Association directly challenged the Founders compromise on sovereignty,
exclaiming that "if a dissolution of the Union must be the alternative, he was
ready to meet it.",
76
65. See FREEHLING, supra note 42 at 112.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 493.
69. Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United Sates, and the Negro Seaman Acts, 1822-1848, 1 J. OF S.
HIST. 3, 5 (1935).
70. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 494.
71. Id. at 493.
72. Id. at 494.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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In rejecting states' rights arguments, Justice Johnson identified two specific
federal rights that were at stake. First, he described "navigation of ships" as an
element of the "paramount and exclusive right" of Congress to regulate
commerce. 77 Second, he referred to an 1815 treaty with Great Britain establishing
"reciprocal liberty of commerce" and in particular "the right of navigating their
ships in their own way.",78 In Johnson's view, transfer of commerce and treaty
powers to the federal government eliminated state authority to enact conflicting
legislation.79
All of Justice Johnson's remonstrance against the law and actions of his state,
however, were rendered dictum by his court's lack of jurisdiction. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 only extended habeas corpus jurisdiction to persons held under the
authority of the United States. Because Elkison was being held in a state jail by
state authorities, Johnson concluded that he had no right to intervene.8 ° While
passage of the South Carolina statute may have been "tantamount to a declaration
of war,"81 relief would have to come from other federal authorities.
Through passage and implementation of what became known as the "Negro
Seamen Act," South Carolina had claimed its sovereignty and asserted its
supremacy. Other southern states followed the South Carolina example and
enacted similar laws.82 Appeals to federal authorities for relief were often made,
but to no effect. In an 1824 letter to John Quincy Adams, Justice Johnson
complained that he had been "obliged to see the Constitution 'trampled on' by
men... 'as much influenced by the Pleasure of bringing its Functionaries into
contempt by exposing their impotence as by any other consideration
whatever.'83
British authorities demanded "redress and reparation" and repeal of the
"obnoxious law."84 After conferring with President Monroe, Secretary of State
Adams sought the opinion of Attorney General William Wirt who concluded that
South Carolina's law conflicted with the Commerce Clause and with the laws
and treaties of the United States.85 In response to a letter from Adams to the
Governor of South Carolina, however, the state senate declared that "[t]he duty
of the state to guard against insubordination or insurrection ... is paramount to
77. Id. at 495.
78. Id.
79. Johnson expressed these views more explicitly in his concurring opinion in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 226 (1824), noting that, upon ratification of the Constitution, state laws regulating interstate
commerce "dropped lifeless from their statute books, for want of the sustaining power, that had been
relinquished to Congress."
80. Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 496-97.
81. Id. at 496.
82. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 38 (1981) (discussing Georgia law against black seamen).
83. Hamer, supra note 69, at 8.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 10.
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all laws, all treaties, all constitutions.' '86 Despite periodic protests, South
Carolina continued to imprison black seamen. British authorities made eight
subsequent written protests to the federal government, but to no avail.87
3. Samuel Hoar and the Conflicts Over Sovereignty
After Andrew Jackson became president, responses from the attorney
general's office changed to support the validity of South Carolina's law. Attorney
General John M. Berrien, from Georgia, took a states' rights view of the issue,
concluding that the Tenth Amendment took precedence over federal commerce
clause authority.88 When Roger Taney took Berrien's place, he approached the
issue from a different perspective that foreshadowed his defense of slavery in the
case of Dred Scott.89 In a lengthy opinion, Attorney General Taney concluded
that:
The African race in the United States even when free, are everywhere a
degraded class .... They were not looked upon as citizens by the
contracting parties who formed the Constitution ... [a]nd were not
intended to be embraced in any of the provisions of that Constitution but
those which point to them in terms not to be mistaken.90
Taney also relied upon arguments that states could not have ceded power over
such issues to the federal government. "The slave holding states could not have
surrendered this power, without bringing upon themselves inevitably the evils of
insurrection and rebellion among their slaves .... 91 Both Berren and Taney
thus foreclosed a federal response to South Carolina's seizure of northern or
British seamen with African ancestry.92
The public controversy, however, continued. In 1842, as a member of the
House of Representatives, John Quincy Adams sponsored resolutions asking the
President to release state department documents related to the Negro Seamen
Acts. Over protests from a South Carolina delegate, the House passed the
86. FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 115.
87. Hamer, supra note 69, at 14.
88. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 82, at 38.
89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (concluding that Congress had no power to free slaves in
United States territories because African Americans had no claim to constitutional rights).
90. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 82, at 38. Fehrenbacher explains that Taney's opinion "had little
influence at the time, because for some reason it was not published along with other opinions of the attorney
general" but it included "the same harsh racial doctrine that he would proclaim from the bench twenty-five
years later." Id. at 39.
91. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TANEY PERIOD
1836-64, at 380 (1974).
92. Note, however, that Taney conceded the existence of conflicting views on the subject: "Indeed,
judging by the past I think it highly probable that the Court will declare the law of South Carolina null and void
if contrary to the stipulations in the treaty whenever the subject comes before it." id. at 381.
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resolutions, the President complied, and Adams arranged for the publication in
Boston of those documents along with Justice Johnson's opinion.93 Although a
House of Representatives Committee supported a declaration that the acts
violated the Constitution, the full House of Representatives tabled the issue.94
When federal authorities failed to act, Massachusetts decided to take up the cause
and sent Samuel Hoar as an emissary to Charleston "for the purpose of instituting
suits and bringing the question of the constitutionality of the acts before the
Supreme Court."
95
Hoar traveled with his daughter to Charleston and upon arrival presented a
statement of purpose to the Governor of South Carolina that was transmitted to
the state legislature.96 That body denounced Hoar as a "dangerous ... emissary
of a foreign Government," and sought his expulsion.97 Echoing arguments made
by former Attorneys General Berrien and Taney, the South Carolina legislature
couched its arguments both in the inherent right of the state to exclude "seditious
persons" from their territory, and the claim that "free negroes and persons of
color" were not United States citizens and therefore not protected by "the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. 98 Before Hoar could
be formally expelled, the threat of mob violence forced him to flee from
Charleston.99
Other events of national importance coincided with Samuel Hoar's visit to
Charleston. On the same day that the news reported the South Carolina
legislative effort to expel Hoar, it also reported John Quincy Adams' effort in
Congress to rescind rules of the House of Representatives that excluded petitions
for abolition. 10° On the day after Hoar's arrival in Charleston, the South Carolina
House of Representatives was asked to call a Convention to be held in Charleston
of the "Southern States of this Confederacy."10' The purpose of the proposed
Convention was "to solicit the cooperation of our sister States of the South in the
effort to reform the Legislature of the Federal Government on the subject of the
Tariff, and avert the progress of Abolition."10 2 Intermingled issues of slavery,
tariffs, federalism, and state sovereignty thus combined to drive the agenda of
South Carolina legislators.
93. Hamer, supra note 69, at 21-22.
94. Id. at 22.
95. Id. Massachusetts also sent an emissary to New Orleans on the same mission, and with the same
results. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id. at 22-23.
98. STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 238 (Herman
V. Ames ed., 1970) [hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS].
99. See Hamer, supra note 69 at 23.
100. THE CHARLESTON MERCURY, Dec. 7, 1844, at 2.
101. THE CHARLESTON COURIER, Dec. 2, 1844, at 2.
102. Id.
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4. The Legacy of Samuel Hoar's Mission
The Hoar affair did not simply die a quiet death. In words that typified the
southern perspective, editors of the Charleston Mercury expressed an expectation
that Hoar's experiences were "likely to prove a salutary and durable lesson."'
0 3
The legislatures of Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama all endorsed the
actions of South Carolina and condemned those of Massachusetts. °4 Meanwhile,
the Massachusetts legislature demanded congressional action to protect her
citizens in 1845 and again in 1852, both times to no avail.10 5 The British
ambassador continued to press the point with the federal executive, but James
Buchanan, President Polk's Secretary of State in 1847, asserted that the federal
government lacked the power to meet the British demands and warned that
continued appeals for equal treatment of black British seamen could lead to
annulment of the Commercial Convention of 1815 between the United States and
Great Britain. 106
The harsh treatment of Samuel Hoar galvanized slavery opponents in the
northern states. Far from learning their lesson, northern politicians used the Hoar
event as a focal point for their complaints against the south, evidenced by
Congressional debates which recorded the subsequent life of the incident. In
1849, while debating the future of slavery in the District of Columbia,
Congressman Charles Hudson recounted the history of British complaints, Justice
Johnson's decision in the Elkison case, the treatment of Hoar, and the efforts
made by South Carolina to block Supreme Court consideration of the issues.
10 7
One year later, Senator Henry Clay addressed the Compromise of 1850 by
recounting Hoar's experience of being driven out of Charleston, 0 8 and the
venerable senator from Massachusetts, Daniel Webster, referred to Hoar's
attempt to address the "unjustifiable, and oppressive" South Carolina
legislation.10 9 In 1854, while debating terms for the admission of Kansas and
Nebraska as new states, the experiences of Hoar were again debated on the floor
of Congress.' In 1856, Massachusetts Congressman Linus Comins read from a
letter drafted by Samuel Hoar about the violent threats made at the time of his
expulsion from Charleston."'
103. THE CHARLESTON MERCURY, Dec. 11, 1844, at 2.
104. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 237.
105. Id. at 238.
106. Hamer, supra note 69, at 25.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19 (1849).
108. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 123 (1850).
109. Id. at 482.
110. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 1154-55 (1854) (remarks of Representative William Boyce,
South Carolina Democrat, and Edward Dickinson, Massachusetts Whig); id. at app. 1012 (remarks of Senator
Charles Sumner, Massachusetts Republican); id. at app. 1556 (remarks of Senator Andrew Butler, South
Carolina Democrat).
111. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1598 (1856).
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After the Civil War, as members of Congress debated constitutional
amendments, references to the Hoar affair continued.' 12 While advocating
promulgation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congressman William Kelley, a
Pennsylvania Republican, noted that "[i]t was slavery that denied the right of
asylum to the beautiful and accomplished daughter of Samuel Hoar, of
Massachusetts, and expelled that venerable scholar, jurist, and statesman from
the limits of South Carolina."'1 3 Six months later, still debating the same
amendment, Congressman John Kasson, Republican from Iowa, noted that "it
was slavery which positively refused the agents of what gentlemen are pleased to
style a Sovereign State in the Union a hearing in its courts." '" 4 When Senator
John Sherman, an Ohio Republican, addressed the enforcement clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment, he did so by explaining that "in the celebrated case of
Mr. Hoar," failure to provide federal protection was not for lack of a
constitutional right to "exercise the immunity of a citizen of the United States,"
but rather the lack of an enforcement mechanism. "This Constitutional provision
was in effect a dead letter ... [because] there was no provision in the
Constitution by which Congress could enforce this right."
'
"
15
In 1866, in his first speech before Congress in support of an amendment to
the Constitution that would protect the "equal rights of every man,"
' 1 6
Congressman John Bingham of Ohio denounced the lack of safety for "a citizen
of Massachusetts ... found anywhere in the streets of Charleston." ' 17 He went on
to decry the "utter disregard" of South Carolina for the "privileges and
immunities ... [of] the honored representative of Massachusetts."'' 8 Debate on
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was peppered with references to Hoar," 9 including
the lament of Congressman John Broomall that,
[s]trange as it may seem, while the Government of the United States has
been held competent to protect the lowest menial of the minister of the
most obscure prince in Europe, anywhere between the two oceans, and
from the Lakes to the Gulf, it had no power to protect the personal liberty
of the agent of the State of Massachusetts in the city of Charleston, or
enable him to sue in the State courts.
20
112. In his chronicle of the Reconstruction Debates, Alfred Avins notes thirteen separate references to
the "Hoar incident in South Carolina." See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13 TH
, 
14 TH
, AND 15'" AMENDMENTS 748 (Alfred
Avins ed., 1967).
113. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864).
114. Id. at 193 (referring to the "ignominious" treatment of Hoar which would not have occurred "if
slavery had not existed").
115. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 41 (1865).
116. Id. at 158.
117. Id. at 157.
118. Id. at 158.
119. See, e.g., id. at 475 (containing remarks of Senator Trumbull).
120. Id. at 1263.
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In 1871, Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, a New Jersey Republican, advocated
passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act, 121 remnants of which may be found today in 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He noted that prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, "when citizens
of Massachusetts went to South Carolina they were imprisoned, and when Judge
Hoar went to argue their cause he was mobbed."'122 The "extreme State-rights
doctrine denied all national citizenship" to persons like Hoar. 23 The Ku Klux
Klan Act would enforce the Fourteenth Amendment protection given to the
"privileges of citizens of the United States." 124
References to congressional debates illustrate a simple point, that Samuel
Hoar's treatment when he arrived in Charleston Harbor remained on the minds of
northern congressman who crafted the Fourteenth Amendment. The continued
notoriety of Hoar and his family undoubtedly fueled attention to the episode.
Samuel Hoar had been a member of Congress in the 1830s, and chaired the 1855
State convention forming the Republican Party in Massachusetts. 25 His son
George Frisbie Hoar served in Congress from 1869 to 1904, including six terms
as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 126 He has been identified as one
of the persons "principally responsible for convincing President Grant to issue
the message" that led to enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act and evolved into 42
U.S.C. § 1983.127 Another son, Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar, became the United
States Attorney General in 1869. One year later, the Senate rejected President
Grant's nomination of Rockwood Hoar to the United States Supreme Court. In
1873, Rockwood Hoar also became a member of Congress., 28 Prominent
presence of the Hoar sons would have underscored the significance of Samuel
Hoar's trip to Charleston for those who shaped civil rights enforcement policies
in the 1870s.
Some have treated the Hoar affair as evidence that, when Congress
promulgated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
members of Congress had in mind Hoar's freedom of speech and his right to
petition the South Carolina government. 129 From that evidence, we might
logically deduce that drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause intentionally
used that language to incorporate the protections of the Bill of Rights. Clearly,
121. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1871).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 501.
125. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1996, at 1220 (John D. Treese
ed., 1997) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY].
126. Id.
127. David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for
the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 497, 544 (1992) (arguing that members of the forty-second Congress
intended to give priority to individual rights over immunity claims).
128. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY, supra note 125, at 1220.
129. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 261, 301 (1998).
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however, the Hoar affair was not just about free speech. The events of 1842 also
reflected underlying issues of federalism, and in particular the perceived lack of
federal power to assure that individuals could initiate actions to enforce federal
law against recalcitrant states.1 30 Hoar's trip came about in response to South
Carolina's laws which defied Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause protections of
the right to navigate freely in and out of Charleston Harbor. Hoar planned to
argue that all United States citizens were entitled to the protection of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, but South Carolina authorities
blocked him from being able to raise those arguments. 13 1 As Senator Sherman
explained, the incident showed the need for effective enforcement of federal
rights against states. Individuals lacked the ability to enforce federal law against
state authorities; as understood at the time, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities Clause assured that such problems would never arise again. 1
32
B. The Nullification Crisis
The conflict over black seamen provides one thread leading from Charleston
Harbor to promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A second thread,
intertwined with the first, wove around tariff disputes between the North and
South, and in a fundamental sense again involved southern efforts to preserve the
institution of slavery.
On November 24, 1832, a South Carolina convention adopted by
overwhelming vote an Ordinance of Nullification, declaring federal tariff laws
"utterly null and void.' 33 In ominous and ironic terms, the convention delegates
declared "we would infinitely prefer that the territory of the state should be the
cemetery of freemen than the habitation of slaves."' 34 Three days later, Governor
Hamilton called for a complete revision of the state's militia laws and asked the
legislature to raise an army of 12,000 volunteers.
135
In Washington, D.C., an enraged President Andrew Jackson swore to enforce
the tariff laws and to crush the nullification movement, using force if
necessary. 136 He threatened to hang the leading nullifiers, 137 directing such
comments with particular force against his own Vice President, John C.
130. More than two decades later, Congressman John Bingham repeatedly emphasized the need for
federal authority to enforce its laws. See infra text accompanying notes 285-306.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
132. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 57, 71-73 (1993) (noting John Bingham's repeated references to the need for federal authority to enforce,
"at a minimum," the Bill of Rights).
133. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES' RIGHTS, AND THE
NULLIFICATION CRISIS 75-76 (1987).
134. Id. at 75.
135. Id. at 76.
136. Id. at 77.
137. Id.
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Calhoun.138 As Jackson fortified the federal troops in Charleston Harbor, 139
Daniel Webster wrote: "I am prepared any day to hear that matters have come to
blows in Charleston .... I have not the slightest doubt, that both General Jackson
and Governor Hamilton Jr. fully expect a decision by the sword.'
140
Some scholars have viewed the nullification dispute as a discrete incident in
United States history limited to economic differences over imports and exports.
Southern opposition to national tariffs has been depicted as part of an emerging
republican ideology reflecting a "love of liberty and independence." 141 In a
thorough account of the intellectual history of antebellum South Carolina,
however, Manisha Sinha demonstrates that the nullification doctrine was rooted
in a "separatist ideology based on the values of slavery and a rigorous critique of
democracy, rather than democratic and republican principles.' 42 This separatist
ideology, in turn, provided support for preservation of state sovereignty even in
the face of countervailing constitutional rights and federal laws.
1. Background to the Tariff Conflict
James Madison introduced the first United States Tariff Act which Congress
enacted in 1789. 143 From the outset, tariff policies provoked sectional conflict.
Already in 1790, a free trade proponent warned that protective tariffs would lead
to "dissolution of the Union."' 44 Subsequent tariffs increased in amount and
added to the range of protected products, including woolens, iron, lead, glass,
hemp and salt.1 45 From a southern perspective, tariff policies protected northern
industry while exposing the south to the prospect of retaliation from foreign
competitors. 146 Furthermore, at the same time that the cost of consumer goods
went up, the price of cotton fell.147 When economic stagnation hit South Carolina
in the 1820's, national tariff policies became a ready target to blame for the
miseries of the cotton farmers. 48 The tariff of 1828, condemned as an
"abomination," raised rates toward 50 percent of the value of imported goods. 1
49
138. Id. at 78.
139. Id. at 79.
140. Id. at 78-79.
141. SINHA, supra note 45, at 3. As an example, Sinha cites Lacy Ford's depiction of white South
Carolinians as favoring "not the planter ideal or the slaveholding ideal, but the 'old country republican' ideal of
personal independence, given peculiar fortification by the use of black slaves as a mud-sill class." Id. (quoting
LACY K. FORD, ORIGINS OF SOUTHERN RADICALISM 372 (1988)).
142. Id. at 2-3.
143. Louis P. MASUR, 1831: YEAR OF ECLIPSE 145 (2001).
144. Id. (quoting Letter from James Martin, Jr., to Willie P. Mangum (Dec. 27, 1831).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. SINHA, supra note 45, at 16.
149. FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 94 (quoting Pierce Butler).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
John C. Calhoun began his political career as a nationalist and a "war
hawk."5 ° In 1816, he voted in favor of the national tariff, and in 1825 he opposed
the faction in the South Carolina legislature that passed resolutions declaring
national tariff laws unconstitutional. 5 ' At the time, George McDuffie, a Calhoun
protfg6 declared the doctrine of "states' rights" a "refuge of ambitious and less
talented men who could not make their mark in national politics.' 5 2 Shortly
thereafter, however, Calhoun's views shifted.
Tariff policies became characterized as "an unholy bargain struck between
the North and the West at the cost of the South.153 In 1827, Robert J. Turnbull
published a series of essays entitled "The Crisis" in which he linked national
tariff policy to slavery, arguing that the same constitutional clauses used to
justify tariff laws could also be relied upon to abolish slavery. 54 Turnbull argued
that southern slaveholders needed to turn to their states in order to protect
themselves from a hostile majority.1 55 Sectionalism, slavery and anti-tariff
arguments became closely linked. 1
56
By 1827, Calhoun had contrived "the idea of a state 'negative' as a way to
'compel the majority' to redress the grievances of the slaveholding minority.' ' 157
He identified the concept of state sovereignty and the power to nullify federal
law as a solution to the problem of a sectional majority dominating a sectional
minority. 18
Calhoun's new doctrine departed from prior states' rights dogma in two
significant ways. First, traditional theory had been based upon a conception of
powers divided between state and federal governments with each sovereign
within its sphere.159 Calhoun and the nullifiers introduced the concept that
sovereign states had authority to check the federal government, thereby
breaching the understanding of national preeminence with respect to enumerated
powers. 60 Second, because constitutional text did not support the nullification
doctrine, it violated the "strict construction" rule that had been previously
accepted as a cardinal tenet of states' rights advocates.1
61
150. SINHA, supra note 45, at 16.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing statements of George McDuffie).
153. Id. at 17 (citing the contentions of David J. McCord).
154. Id. at 18; FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 127-28.
155. SINHA, supra note 45, at 18; FREEHLING, supra note 42, at 127.
156. SINHA, supra note 45, at 18.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 22.
159. ld. at 24.
160. Id.
161. Id. (noting that John Randolph "opposed nullification as unrepublican and as going far beyond the
written word of the Constitution").
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Advocates tried to tie the nascent nullification doctrine to early writings of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 162 The term "nullification" had appeared
in the Kentucky Resolution of 1798 in the context of a response to the Alien and
Sedition Act.' 63 Jefferson, who had secretly authored early drafts of the Kentucky
Resolution, used the term "nullification" as part of an appeal to other states to
join "in declaring these acts void and of no force. ' ' 64
The notion that states could nullify federal law or, as described in the Virginia
Resolution, "interpose" themselves to arrest the "progress of evil," 65 contained
elements of claims to state sovereignty echoed by the South Carolina nullifiers. But
significant factors distinguish Jefferson's words in the Kentucky Resolution from
the doctrine of John C. Calhoun. An emphasis upon strict construction in both the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 66 was consistent with their attack on the Alien
and Sedition Acts which, in addition to being beyond the delegated powers of
Congress, were also "expressly and positively forbidden" by the First
Amendment. 67 It has also been pointed out that Jefferson "never did quite say
whether a single state could properly judge the constitutionality of a federal law
[or] whether, if so, such action could be taken by the legislature."'' 68 He at least
implied that the appropriate course for states that opposed federal law, upon failing
to secure a reversal through political means, was secession; states could not nullify
federal law while remaining in the Union.
169
Madison, who was still living at the time of the nullification crisis, actively
opposed Calhoun's reliance upon the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 7 He had
previously expressed fear that legislators would miss the distinction between the
"exercise of unconstitutional power" and the "abuse of constitutional power."' 7'
The Alien and Sedition Act exemplified the former, South Carolina's objection to
federal tariffs the latter. Madison viewed state claims to power over elements of
interstate commerce as tantamount to a return to the bad old days of the Articles of
Confederation, when each state asserted sovereign rights to independence from the
central government. 7 2 Directly addressing the nullification debate, Madison
explained that "[a] supremacy in the Constitution and laws of the Union, without a
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163. Id. at 77.
164. Id. at 79.
165. LANCE BANNING, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THREE CONVERSATIONS FROM THE FOUNDING 215
(1995).
166. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 719 (1993).
167. Id. at 720.
168. Id. at 721.
169. Id.
170. 6 IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON COMMANDER IN CHIEF 1812-1836, at 468-500 (1961).
171. Id. at 470.
172. Id. Madison also claimed, from the outset, to have rejected nullification on grounds that safeguards
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supremacy in the exposition and execution of them, would be as much a mockery
as a scabbard put into the hands of a soldier without a sword in it. ' "
Calhoun and his cohorts faced another, more basic problem with relying upon
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions as a basis for asserting state authority to
nullify federal law. In spite of the stature of Jefferson and Madison, other states had
soundly rebuked their calls to action. No states followed the Kentucky and Virginia
leads. Ten states passed their own resolutions emphatically repudiating those from
Kentucky and Virginia.174 As explained in Vermont's response to Virginia, "It
belongs not to state legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by
the general government; this power being exclusively vested in the judiciary courts
of the Union."'
175
Calhoun developed his ideas about nullification at the same time that he served
in the office of Vice President, beginning in 1825 in the administration of John
Quincy Adams and continuing four years later in Andrew Jackson's first
administration. His own political ambitions led him to attempt to appear above the
fray on issues that deeply divided the nation. In 1827, however, he was forced by
his position as Vice President to cast the deciding vote against the woolen tariff
bill. 76 Calhoun gradually assumed a stronger ideological role. In 1828, he secretly
wrote the South Carolina Exposition and Protest which became recognized as the
first public recognition of the "nullification doctrine."' 177 The Exposition criticized
the 1828 Tariff Act as "unconstitutional, unequal and oppressive, and calculated to
corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of the country.' 78 To correct that
abuse, Calhoun argued that delegation of limited powers to the national
government "clearly implies a veto or control, within its limits, on the action of the
General Government, on contested points of authority."'179 A state declaration that
an act of Congress was null or void would bind the citizens of the State and the
General Government itself.
180
While Calhoun initially guarded the secrecy of his authorship of the
Exposition, there could be little question that his strong ideological views would
eventually clash with those of President Jackson. Jackson had been an advocate of
states' rights in more traditional terms. He abhorred nullification as both anti-
democratic and anti-Union. 18' By 1830, Jackson and Calhoun had openly split,
with Jackson suspecting his vice-president of treasonous behavior. 182
173. Id. at 489 (refuting contentions of Senator Hayne's that the Virginia Resolutions sustained South
Carolina's doctrine).
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2. Debating Nullification: To the Brink of War and Back
The "Great Debate" 183 between Robert Y. Hayne and Daniel Webster began
in response to a simple proposal for management of federal land. 184 By the time
both Hayne and Webster had delivered their second speech, however, it had
become a "spectacle... of epic proportions."'' 85 Hayne, who rose to the Senate
shortly after commanding the troops who quashed the incipient rebellion of
Denmark Vesey in Charleston,186 has been described as "youthful and
debonair."'187 Daniel Webster responded "like a 'great canon loaded to the
lips."" 88 Substance of the debates ranged from verbal jousting about Banquo's
ghost, 189 to questions about whether South Carolina or Massachusetts had been
most loyal to the Union, 90 to battles over slavery, tariffs, and state sovereign
rights to nullify federal legislation.
On the issue of slavery, Webster exclaimed the "great wisdom and foresight"
of the Ordinance of 1787 which barred slavery northwest of the Ohio River,' 9'
pronounced "domestic slavery as one of the greatest evils, both moral and
political,"' 192 but disclaimed any interest in that "matter of domestic policy left
with the States themselves .. .."193 Hayne, on the other hand, blamed others for
instigating the slave trade, leaving southerners to "fulfill the high trust which had
devolved upon us as the owners of slaves.' 94 He contrasted southern treatment
of slaves with the plight of African Americans in the north: "[T]here does not
exist, on the face of the whole earth, a population so poor, so wretched, so vile,
so loathsome, so utterly destitute of all the comforts, conveniences, and decencies
of life, as the unfortunate blacks of Philadelphia."'' 95 Hayne's defense included
the claim that slavery was "now contributing largely to the wealth and prosperity
of every state in this Union ....,,196
183. THE GREAT DEBATE BETWEEN ROBERT YOUNG HAYNE OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND DANIEL
WEBSTER OF MASSACHUSETrS (Lindsay Swift ed., 1898).
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In his speeches, Hayne limited references to the term "nullification" to a
quotation from Thomas Jefferson and the Kentucky Resolution. 97 Instead of
repeating that word, he euphemistically referred to the "South Carolina
doctrine,"' 98 describing the Constitution as a "compact" among the states, and
claiming that the states were thereby "duty bound" to "arrest... the progress of
the evil. . . in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of...
powers not granted by the said compact."' 199 Adding an ominous note to the
proceedings, and foreshadowing the seriousness of the issues, Hayne defended
South Carolina's "firm, manly, and steady resistance against usurpation. ' 2°
Declaring the state's "uniform, zealous, ardent, and uncalculating devotion to the
Union," Hayne nevertheless added that "[i]f the gentleman provokes the war, he
shall have war .... I will not stop at the border; I will carry the war into the
enemy's territory, and not consent to lay down my arms until I shall have
obtained 'indemnity for the past and security for the future."' 20 1
Webster's response to Hayne is among the most famous of all defenses of
national supremacy. Looking back to the problems of Confederation, Webster
claimed that "[iut was the very object of the constitution to create unity of
interests to the extent of the powers of the General Government .... [T]he very
chief end, the main design, for which the whole Constitution was framed and
adopted was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act through
State agency, or depend on State opinion and State discretion.'2 2 He declared
that "[n]o State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the constitution,
or any law of the United States, '20 3 and defended the people's choice of the
judicial branch of the general government as repository of the power to construe
the Constitution. 204 Drawing upon his oratorical skills, Webster concluded his
second speech with the "sentiment, dear to every true American heart-Liberty
and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable !,,205 Adding to the drama, Vice
President John C. Calhoun chaired the proceedings and "angrily called [the
Senate] to order" at the conclusion of Webster's speech. 06
The Hayne-Webster debate helped to set the stage for proceedings that
followed. In South Carolina, the 1830 election cycle began with a clear division
between "radicals," who were determined to nullify national tariff laws, and
"moderates," who opposed making a radical break from the union.20 7 By the
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198. Id. at 56.
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200. Id. at 58.
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October legislative elections, however, the issue had become obscured by
divisions among alternative courses of action, and no clear direction for the state
was determined by the outcome. 20 8 By the end of the year, nullifiers in the new
legislature succeeded in calling for a convention to determine a course of action
for the state.209
In 1831, the nullification debate intensified.210 Calhoun, who harbored
presidential ambitions, was forced to take a stand on the issue and publicly
announced his support for nullification in his Fort Hill Letter.211 While
"unionists" ridiculed the "absurd remedy" of the "Calhounites, 212 the pro-
nullification movement gained momentum throughout South Carolina.213
Nullifiers made an effort to challenge the constitutionality of the federal tariff
in court. Their initial attempt failed when the federal district attorney for South
Carolina chose to resign rather than prosecute the individuals who had refused to
pay the "prohibitive" tariff on a bale of cotton.214 When the case eventually went
to trial, the judge prevented the jury from hearing constitutional arguments,
ordered that their role was limited to deciding issues of fact, leading to a jury
verdict that defendants who initiated the "test case" owed the tariff.215 The South
Carolina legislature then passed a law allowing juries to hear constitutional
questions, but did so knowing that their action would have little effect in federal
court.
2 16
In the summer of 1832, Congress enacted modest tariff reform, which
President Jackson thought would remove the grievances of the nullifiers.21 7
Calhoun, on the other hand, viewed the weak reforms as proof that adequate
relief would not be forthcoming, writing: "The hope of the country now rests on
our gallant little state. Let every Carolinian do his duty.,
218
Rising fears of a slave rebellion, fueled by Nat Turner's uprising in Virginia,
added to the agitation felt by South Carolinians in 1832.19 On July fourth of that
year, celebrations were held to "kick off' the final phase of the campaign for
nullification. 220 On the same day, a slave cook in Sumter poisoned a feast,
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"killing several celebrants and leaving two hundred others desperately ill.",221 As
the 1832 elections approached, armed mobs regularly roamed Charleston;
nullifiers and unionists barely escaped all-out battles in the streets.222 Prompted
by the combination of reactions to tariffs and slavery agitation, nullifiers swept
the elections and gained a commanding two-thirds majority in the state
223legislature.
The new South Carolina legislature met in October 1832 and quickly voted
to form a convention to deal with the issue of nullification.224 The Convention
adopted an ordinance that "declared the [federal] tariffs of 1828 and 1832
unconstitutional, and null and void in South Carolina., 225 Senator Hayne joined
the Convention and helped to convince the delegates to include a declaration for
secession in the event that the federal government attempted to force compliance
with its tariffs. 226 Nullifiers also added a "test oath" to the ordinance requiring
office holders to uphold the ordinance itself and all legislation enacted to sustain
it.227 Immediately after the Convention, when the state legislature reconvened,
Senator Hayne resigned to become the new Governor of South Carolina; Calhoun
resigned as Vice President and was elected as the new senator from South
Carolina.228
In the weeks following the South Carolina Convention, the two sides moved
steadily towards confrontation. President Jackson transferred military companies
to the islands in Charleston Harbor under the command of General Winfield
Scott.229 Governor Hayne rallied his supporters with a "full-blown statement of
state supremacy., 230 On December 10, 1832, Jackson made his famous
Nullification Proclamation, declaring "the power to annul a law of the United
States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union,
contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit,
... and destructive of the great object for which it was formed. 23' The South
Carolina legislature responded with an order to Governor Hayne to issue a
counter-proclamation, and Hayne again made the case for nullification.232 The
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governor also issued a proclamation seeking volunteers to defend the state, and
more than 25,000 joined an untrained, but enthusiastic, volunteer army.233
Both sides in the dispute attempted to maneuver so as to avoid being
identified as the aggressor. The state devised a complicated scheme that would
have forced the Customs Collector to forego federal duties or risk seizure of his
personal property in slaves.234 The federal government countered by moving the
customs-house onto the federal islands in Charleston Harbor.23 5 In what became
known as the Force Bill, Congress authorized President Jackson to enforce the
customs collection, protect the customs collector's property, establish federal
jails if necessary to house Carolinians who violated federal laws, and allow
immediate use of the national army and navy.236
The Force Bill triggered yet another debating spectacle on the floor of the
United States Senate. John C. Calhoun, the new South Carolina Senator, now
represented the honor and ideology of his state. Daniel Webster again stated the
case for national supremacy and responded to Calhoun: "Nullification, if
successful, arrests the power of the law, absolves citizens from their duty,
subverts the foundation both of protection and obedience ... and elevates another
authority to supreme command .... [W]e cannot have one rule or one law for
South Carolina, and another for other States. 237 He explained "that, as to certain
purposes, the people of the United States are one people. They are one in making
war, and one in making peace; they are one in regulating commerce, and one in
laying duties of impost. ' 238 John C. Calhoun countered with arguments for
ultimate state authority: "Ours has every attribute which belongs to a federative
system .... It is founded on compact; it is formed by sovereign communities,
and is binding between them .... The sovereignty is in the parts and not the
whole., 239 Webster replied: "[T]he constitution was not a compact between
States, but a constitution, established by the people, with a Government founded
on popular election, and directly responsible to the people themselves. 24°
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In February of 1833, the sound and fury of the confrontation over
nullification began to subside. Both sides had rushed to the brink of war, but, as
illustrated by their avoidance maneuvers, neither wanted to be viewed as the
military aggressor, and neither relished actual military confrontation.
Senator Henry Clay emerged as the "Great Compromiser ' 24' by fashioning a
tariff reform bill which reduced protectionism beyond the limited reductions of
1832, but over a long period of time and decidedly less than had been demanded
as a minimum reform by the South Carolina Nullification Convention.242
Calhoun immediately joined Clay in support of the compromise.243 President
Jackson emerged as the apparent "winner" of the confrontation. By securing
passage of both the Force Bill and the Tariff Compromise, he achieved the
"solution" to the conflict that he had long been advocating. 2"
In March, South Carolina opened a new Convention. Delegates accepted the
federal compromise, symbolically "nullified" the Force Bill, and repealed their
prior nullification ordinance.245 Although they had not established a "right" to
nullify federal law, they had nevertheless made effective use of the threat of
nullification to win significant legislative reform. Perhaps most important,
Calhoun, Hayne and their followers had established a rival vision of federalism
in which state sovereignty survived the "plan of the convention" as a significant
factor that could be used to check the enumerated powers of Congress.
C. Secession, Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment
Although the Compromise of 1833 could be viewed as a triumph for
nationalism, with successful recognition of President Jackson's anti-nullification
doctrine, the broader conflict between states' rights and national authority did not
disappear. While tariff disputes receded from the public agenda, slavery
remained as the underlying division between the North and South. Perceived
threats to the institution of slavery continued to motivate South Carolina
politicians who feared national domination. The new, "pro-slavery" brand of
federalism thus continued to stir the South.
1. South Carolina Secession
South Carolina led the way to secession from the United States. The
"nullification crisis" and conflict over the arrest of black seamen had established
the groundwork. By 1850, public opinion in South Carolina favored secession,
but political leaders were divided over questions of whether to proceed
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independently or wait for other states to join the cause.246 In 1850, the South
Carolina legislature issued a call for a convention of slave-holding states,
authorized the governor to call a state convention, and appropriated funds for
development of the state military defense.247 A state convention in 1852 adopted
an Ordinance to declare the right of this State to secede from the Federal
Union,248 but the secession movement temporarily stalled, divided between a
majority advocating cooperation with other states and a minority favoring
independent secession.249
In subsequent years, political battles over slavery and secession continued. In
1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act became a focal point for political debate and
state resolutions and counter-resolutions regarding issues of slavery and states'
rights.2  Indicative of the tenor of the time, when Massachusetts Senator Charles
Sumner delivered an impassioned attack on proslavery activities in Kansas,
Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina physically assaulted him.251 A
committee of the House recommended expulsion of Brooks, but the motion failed
to secure the necessary two-thirds vote in favor, and citizens of South Carolina
subsequently re-elected Brooks by an overwhelming vote.2
On March 6, 1857, the Supreme Court decided the case of Dred Scott v.
Sandford.253 Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court echoed the views he had
expressed as Attorney General when asked to address the rights of black seamen
entering Charleston Harbor. 54 The Chief Justice reasoned that, given the deeply
embedded racism that characterized the legal and constitutional history of this
nation,255 descendants of slaves could not be considered citizens of the United
States, and were therefore not entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizenship. 6 Furthermore, although the federal government exercised "supreme
authority within the scope of the powers granted to it,' ' 257 it had no power to
provide freedom for slaves in the territories that it governed. Chief Justice Taney
concluded that "the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and
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owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States ... is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void.,
258
The Dred Scott decision failed to quell political dissent. In the north,
Wisconsin asserted its authority to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law. 259 In South
Carolina and several other southern states, a movement began to re-institute the
slave trade.26° When federal authorities captured the slave ship Echo and brought
it to Charleston Harbor, a judge rejected claims for freedom for the human cargo,
finding that the Dred Scott case had established "a perpetual and impassable
barrier [between the] white race and the negro. ' 261 In 1859, a jury refused to
convict the crew of the slave ship Wanderer, illustrating "slave traders' success
in the Lower South at emasculating the federal laws against the African slave
trade. 262 When that ship's owner was brought to trial, South Carolina Judge
Andrew G. Magrath "used the opportunity to proclaim the judicial nullification
of the 1820 African slave trade piracy law. 263
When John Brown raided Harper's Ferry in 1859, Governor Gist of South
Carolina called for a conference of southern states, 264 and the South Carolina
legislature reasserted its "right to secede. 265 On October 12, 1860, after initiating
secret correspondence with other southern state governors, Governor Gist called
a special session of the South Carolina legislature.266 After news of President
Lincoln's election victory, the legislature called for a convention of the "People
of the State. 267 On December 20, 1860, this convention adopted an "ordinance
,,268of secession, and four days later issued A Declaration of Causes which
Induced her Secession from the Federal Union.2 69
2. President Lincoln, Charleston Harbor and the Civil War
When President Lincoln assumed office, only two federal forts of
significance remained in the South: Fort Pickens in Pensacola, Florida, and Fort
Sumter in Charleston.27 ° One day after his inauguration, Lincoln received a
message from the commanding officer at Fort Sumter that in order to defend the
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federal enclave in Charleston Harbor he needed more men and a replenishment of
supplies.271 As Lincoln considered the request, southern states consolidated the
Confederacy. Union forts, ships and money had been peacefully transferred to
the Confederate government.272 Both Secretary of State Seward and General
Scott advised Lincoln to abandon Fort Sumter, arguing that all Union support had
disappeared from Charleston. 3 Lincoln rejected their advice and sent supplies to
the Fort along with instructions for its defense.274
South Carolina troops fired the first shots of the Civil War in Charleston
Harbor, and quickly won control over Fort Sumter. In the four years of bloodshed
that followed, 620,000 were killed and another half-million were wounded.275
The Civil War brought about fundamental changes in constitutional values.
President Lincoln anticipated those changes in his Gettysburg Address, which
began by declaring: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on
this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition
that all men are created equal." George Fletcher treats those words as a preamble
to the amended constitution that emerged from the War, with emphasis placed
upon the "interrelated and mutually supportive" values of "nationhood, equality
and democracy. 276 In Fletcher's terms, those values "became the guiding forces
of American politics" and "provided the bedrock for the new constitutional order
erected in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.2 77 As Fletcher
notes, the "least appreciated" of these guiding principles is the "commitment to
nationhood. 278
Lincoln's sense of nationhood carried with it a response to the people of
South Carolina. State governments were not free to defy federal law. States could
not bar American citizens from the use of their ports, nor could they threaten to
punish their citizens for complying with national tariff laws. When the war
279ended, a new sense of nationhood became grounded in the Constitution. In
particular, the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
established the preeminent status of United States citizenship.
3. John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment
Conflicting views surround the legacy of Congressman John Bingham,
principal author of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. In an influential
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article from 1949, Charles Fairman branded Bingham as "inconsistent" and
"confused. 28° Subsequent detractors picked upon the same theme that
Bingham's views were "muddled" 28 and, therefore, not entitled to significant
deference. More recent defenders have revived Bingham's legacy, explaining the
consistency of his views as "cogent" and "clearly expressed. 282
Battles over Bingham have focused almost entirely upon the question of
whether he intended that the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause incorporate the Bill of Rights. This narrow focus contributes to the
confusion that surrounds efforts to reconstruct Bingham's constitutional vision.
By adding the dimension of federalism to the debate, Bingham's use of the
general reference to "privileges or immunities" and his reluctance to limit the
scope of protection to a specified list of rights become more comprehensible.
As Richard Aynes explains, "John Bingham, the 39h Congress, the ratifying
legislatures, and antislavery theorists never suggested that the privileges or
immunities of U.S. citizens were confined to the rights recognized in the first
eight amendments. 283 Aynes recognizes the "worthy challenge" of discovering
and defining these "other" protections.284 The historical context that motivated
the thirty-ninth Congress, including intense experiences involving the events that
occurred in Charleston Harbor described in preceding pages, provides the
background needed to approach the challenge that Aynes identifies.
It is also helpful to keep in mind the fact that, unlike modern theorists,
Bingham was not preoccupied with the issue of direct judicial enforcement of
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment established congressional authority to
identify and protect rights derived from the text of the Constitution and from the
powers granted to Congress within that text. This point can be illustrated with the
language Bingham initially proposed: "The Congress shall have power to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property. 285 Bingham explained that the fundamental need for this text was to
establish congressional power to "enforce obedience to these requirements of the
Constitution., 286 He explained that the text came directly from Article IV of the
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Constitution and from the Bill of Rights, and he assured his colleagues that this
language would not bring about fundamental changes in constitutional
relationships: "[T]he proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the
Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not now
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution. 287 He followed that
statement by quoting the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.288 When asked about
the need for such an amendment if the text was already contained in that
document, Bingham's ally Congressman Kelly explained that "the proposed
amendment will but reinvigorate a primitive and essential power of the
Constitution. 289
The issue became more confused at a subsequent point in the debate when
Congressman Bingham explained that a reason for adopting the proposed
amendment was the existing absence of congressional authority to enforce the
Bill of Rights. He explained that he had no desire to "mar the Constitution of the
country, or take away from any State any right that belongs to it," but he saw no
inconsistency between that proposition and the need "to arm the Congress of the
United States, by the consent of the people of the United States, with the power
to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution." 290 He explained the
need for that element of the amendment by referring to the cases of Barron v.
Baltimore291 and Livingston v. Moore,292 citing both cases for the proposition that
the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.293 These references preceded a
quotation from Daniel Webster's debate denouncing the independent rights of
states.294 Bingham then explained that state legislators take an oath to abide by
the United States Constitution, and as a result, enforcing compliance with the Bill
of Rights should not be seen as anything more than an enforcement of existing
"dut[ies] and oaths. 295
As developed in his arguments before the House of Representatives,
Bingham believed that the Supremacy Clause already should have been adequate
to establish the preeminence of federal law, but his own prior experiences had
287. Id.
288. Id. The text of the Supremacy Clause provides, "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
289. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1058 (1866) (referring specifically to the power of Congress
to determine who should be electors of federal offices, and thereby protecting the "privileges" of voters).
290. Id. at 1088.
291. 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment, requiring compensation for
property taken for public use, applies solely to the government of the United States).
292. 32 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1833) (rejecting challenge to Pennsylvania lien law noting that amendments
to the United States Constitution "do not extend to the states").
293. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
294. Id. (quoting 3 WEBSTER'S WORKS 471).
295. Id.
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illustrated the need for reinforcement. In 1857, Bingham had tried to convince his
colleagues that they should deny Oregon admission to the United States because
of a clause in its proposed state constitution prohibiting entry by African-
Americans. Bingham denied "that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of
the United States from coming within its Territory ... or from the enjoyment
therein of the 'privileges and immunities' of a citizen of the United States. 296 He
explained the conflict between this provision and the constitutional principle that
federal law was supreme.297 During the Civil War, Bingham again emphasized
the importance of federal supremacy: "The Republic can no more live without its
supreme law duly obeyed or duly enforced than can its citizens who compose it
live without air.
' 298
During the debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman
Bingham again emphasized the defiance of federal law that had taken place in
Oregon and throughout the southern states.299 After referencing the southern states
generally, and South Carolina in particular, Bingham declared the need to broaden
federal supremacy: "Unless you put them in terror of the power of your laws... they
may defy your restricted legislative power when reconstructed .... ,300 Over the
course of the debates, the Fourteenth Amendment text evolved so that, in final
form, it protected "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
rather than "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
' 30
'
Congressman Bingham explained the shift in language. The Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will "protect by national law
the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. 30 2 This includes "the right to
bear true allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States."
303
In different words, the initial language that Bingham proposed would have
simply added an element of federal authority to enforce the provisions of Article
IV, Section 2. Taking this step would allow Congress to protect individuals like
Samuel Hoar from being treated as the "emissary of a foreign Government" when
seeking to address the South Carolina government. 3°4 The change in language
broadened congressional power, so that it became clear that Congress had the
power to address additional rights, beyond those embodied by Article IV. In the
future, counterparts of Samuel Hoar would be protected regardless of whether
296. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
297. Id. at 983.
298. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1862).
299. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
300. Id. at 1094.
301. See id. at 2286 (statement of Congressman Stevens).
302. Id. at 2542.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. See discussion supra text accompanying note 97.
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their rights were derived from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
I 301 or from some other legitimate source of federal law.
In the concluding paragraphs of his final speech before the House of
Representatives in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham once again
declared the link between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
constitutional crisis that stemmed from the want of federal power to address the
South Carolina efforts to nullify federal law:
[T]hat body of great and patriotic men looked in vain for any grant of
power in the Constitution by which to give protection to the citizens of
the United States resident in South Carolina against the infamous
provision of the ordinance which required them to abjure the allegiance
which they owed their own country .... That great want of the citizen
and stranger, protection by national law from unconstitutional State
enactments, is supplied by the first section of this amendment.3 °6
With this text and through these words, Congressman John Bingham clarified the
authority of Congress to enforce the United States Constitution, and erased any
doubts regarding the preeminence of federal law.
4. Samuel Miller and Privileges or Immunities
After Congress finished its work in crafting the Fourteenth Amendment,
responsibility for construing that Amendment fell to the United States Supreme
Court. The Court's first opportunity came in 1873 in the Slaughter-House
Cases.30 7 It would be difficult to find a Supreme Court opinion more consistently
and unfairly maligned than Justice Samuel Miller's opinion for the Court in that
case. Charles Black characterized it as "probably the worst holding, in its effect
on human rights, ever uttered by the Supreme Court." 30 8 Other scholars have used
such terms as "shabby '' 3°9 and "shoddy ' 310 to characterize Miller's decision.
305. Note that allowing Congress to enforce Article IV did not mean that Congress also had the power
to determine the content of the privileges and immunities protected by that text. As the United States Supreme
Court determined in 1868, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was limited to protecting rights of comity. See
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying note 411. In other
words, the text originally crafted by Bingham simply gave Congress the power to assure future individuals like
Samuel Hoar that they would have the same basic legal rights as South Carolina residents, without regard to the
specific substance of those rights.
306. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866).
307. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
308. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 55
(1997).
309. Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE
THE CONSTITUTION 197 (1975).
310. Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989).
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After seriously questioning Justice Miller's values and motives, Richard Aynes
concludes that "'everyone' agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. ' 1 '
Most attacks on Slaughter-House focus on the Court's failure to incorporate
the Bill of Rights into the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That issue, however, was not before the Court. Instead, the Justices
were being asked to enshrine Adam Smith's economic theory supporting the
"right of free labor." 312 Not only did the issue of incorporation never directly
arise, recent scholars have demonstrated that a reasonably charitable reading of
Justice Miller's opinion is more consistent with incorporation than with anti-
incorporation doctrine .
3 13
One reason for the mischaracterization of Justice Miller's opinion stems from
the failure to see through the superficial anomaly created by the alignment of the
parties and their counsel. Plaintiffs' lawyers were led by John A. Campbell, a
disciple of John C. Calhoun and former United States Supreme Court Justice who
resigned that position to become an officer in the confederacy.31 4 In contrast,
attorneys for the state had been followers of Daniel Webster, opposed to
secession, and had organized an army to support President Jackson's battle
against nullification.31 5 The plaintiffs had claimed an inherent right to operate
their slaughter-houses independently from a state created monopoly. In response,
the State of Louisiana claimed the right to force plaintiffs to operate within a
prescribed section of the city of New Orleans.
On the surface, it would appear that the case had resurrected the ghosts of
Calhoun and Webster, but with their positions now reversed. Because plaintiffs
argued against states' rights, Aynes characterizes their arguments as "exactly the
opposite of the constitutional positions the 'political partisans' usually took on
questions of the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its various
enforcement acts. 316 Campbell cleverly manipulated that impression by arguing
311. Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 (1994).
312. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 110 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, b. 1, ch. X, part 11; id. at 45-46 (discussing argument of plaintiffs' counsel).
313. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise:
Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1111-15 (2000). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans
Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future--or Reveal the Structure of the
Present? 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 183-84 (1999) (noting that "[it was only a series of later decisions that oddly
attributed to Justice Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases the expulsion of the Bill of Rights
from the privileges or immunities cathedral"). For an account of how the principle of incorporation was lost in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, see Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (2000).
314. See Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughterbouse Cases, 18 TUL. L. REV.
1, 88 (1943).
315. Id. at52.
316. Aynes, supra note 311, at 657.
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that the Fourteenth Amendment had "forever destroyed" the states rights doctrine
of John C. Calhoun. 31 7 Far from being "opposite" to the views of Calhoun,
however, Campbell's arguments were a thinly disguised attempt at preserving
private property rights in the face of government regulation, and in that sense
Campbell and Calhoun remained on exactly the same page. 31 8 Campbell was
making the same argument for the New Orleans butchers that Calhoun had made
for the South Carolina slave owners, and Justice Miller rejected that argument. In
a repeat of the showdown between Calhoun and Webster, Miller came down on
the side of Webster.
It has been noted that Miller and Bingham traveled together on a tour of the
Pacific Coast in 1871, and as a result Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House should
have been more faithful to the views of the Fourteenth Amendment framers.
31 9
Again, however, a sympathetic reading of Slaughter-House demonstrates the
symmetry between Miller's views and the arguments Bingham made on the floor
of the House of Representatives. 320 Both Miller and Bingham eschewed broad
expansions of federal power. In Miller's opinion for the Court, he argued that
federal privileges or immunities were those that "owe their existence to the
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws."3 2 'I That
statement appears entirely consistent with the point made repeatedly by
Bingham: that the Fourteenth Amendment simply reinforced existing
constitutional text.
322
Even more telling are the examples given by Justice Miller, which must be
understood with reference to prior conflicts between South Carolina and the
federal government. Where Bingham explicitly referred to South Carolina in his
arguments before Congress, Miller's references were less explicit but
nevertheless unmistakable. The first category of rights identified by Miller
included negative constraints found in the text of the Constitution. Those would
include the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, which had
been of obvious concern to Bingham, and which had been systematically denied
to African-Americans arriving at the Port of Charleston in the decades leading up
to the Civil War.323
317. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 52.
318. See William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 179 (2002) (noting that "whether he argued for states' rights or
for an expanded version of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, [Campbell] advocated private property rights
and laissez faire economics... [seeking] nullification of government regulations that he perceived as
interfering with those rights").
319. Aynes, supra note 311, at 662; Newsom, supra note 313, at 700 (noting, in particular, that while
traveling, Bingham spoke "upon the relation and dependence of the States to the Nation").
320. See supra text accompanying notes 285-306.
321. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 285-87.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 61-87. Note that the Supreme Court had previously ruled that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did not embrace a body of inherent, substantive rights, but
was rather limited to rights of comity. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). This conclusion is consistent
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
The second category described by Justice Miller included rights derived from
the "national character" of the federal government, including the right "to come
to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government. 324 For authority, Miller cited and quoted the case of Crandall v.
Nevada.325 For an even more vivid example, however, he could have painted the
picture of Samuel Hoar landing at the Port of Charleston and seeking to address
the government of South Carolina.326
Miller illustrated his third category of federal privileges or immunities by
reference to "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances.,,327 Again, the example of Samuel Hoar comes to mind.328 Kevin
Newsom and Bryan Wildenthal have both detailed the argument that this
reference to expressive activity should be understood as incorporating the Bill of
Rights. 329 Extensive evidence in congressional debates supports the view that
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected incorporation,330 and nothing in
Slaughter-House directly contradicts this interpretation.
Finally, to illustrate the point that privileges or immunities could be based
upon federal law more generally, Miller refers to "the [r]ight to use the navigable
waters of the United States" and to "all rights secured to our citizens by treaties
with foreign nations." 33' Navigation and treaty rights had both been implicated by
South Carolina's seizure of black seamen who entered the port of Charleston. In
the Elkison case, Justice Johnson had emphasized the "right to navigate," and had
declared the "utter incompatibility" of South Carolina's law with congressional
commerce clause authority and with the laws and treaties of the United States.332
A review of the history of Charleston Harbor helps to explain the tie between
John Bingham's understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice
Miller's interpretation of that Amendment. It also brings to light the importance
of the Slaughter-House Cases as precedent for contemporary issues of
federalism. The Privileges or Immunities Clause-as understood by its framers,
with the argument that references to "privileges" or "immunities" were understood at the time as encompassing
rights based upon positive law (i.e., statutory or constitutional text) rather than a body of inherent or "natural"
rights. But see James W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings and Misreading: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities,
and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67 (2002) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
incorporated natural rights).
324. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
325. 73 U.S. 35 (1867) (invalidating Nevada state tax on persons traveling out-of-state).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
327. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
328. See AMAR, supra note 129, at 236-37 (linking Hoar's experiences in Charleston to the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
329. See Newsom, supra note 313, at 679; Wildenthal, supra note 313, at 1099.
330. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 129, at 183-85; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-130 (1986).
331. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
332. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 61-87.
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as subsequently construed by the Supreme Court, and as repeatedly explained by
early commentators-reestablished the preeminence of federal law.333
I1. APPLYING NINETEENTH CENTURY LESSONS TO TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY ISSUES
In the nineteenth century, constitutional crises repeatedly revolved around
issues of slavery and federalism, with challenges to national preeminence as their
focal point. The historical record demonstrates that framers and interpreters of
the Constitution shared an understanding that the national government held
supreme authority within the sphere of enumerated congressional powers. Claims
that state sovereignty survived within the realm of national authority arose when
events in South Carolina generated desperate arguments in defense of slavery. As
attorney general, Roger Taney recognized South Carolina's authority to defy
federal treaties and federal protection of individual rights, in order to preserve its
slave society, and therefore refused to protect the "Negro Seamen" arriving in
Charleston's port. John C. Calhoun declared that states retained ultimate
sovereignty. Therefore, South Carolina could defy federal law, nullifying the
federal tariff on goods arriving in Charleston, and threatening to prosecute any
South Carolinians who enforced or complied with the federal law. Like the
Negro Seamen's Act, the Nullification Crisis also reflected a perceived need to
protect the institution of slavery. Both the Negro Seamen's Act and the
Nullification Crisis were direct antecedents to Civil War hostilities, which again
began in Charleston Harbor. Both Congressman John Bingham and Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Miller understood this context as the predicate to their
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As explicitly declared by
Bingham, the Fourteenth Amendment assured that South Carolina would never
again be allowed to defy federal law.334
In the years following the Civil War, however, the central importance of
establishing federal supremacy faded from public consciousness. With the
elimination of disputes over states' rights to establish slavery or to secede,
attention shifted to questions about the scope of newly established individual
rights. A primary focus of that debate was whether the Privileges or Immunities
Clause should be viewed as a primary source of judicially established individual
rights. In that context, a folkloric version of the Slaughter-House Cases became
the bete noir of the constitutional canon.335 By the end of the twentieth century,
scholars, judges and litigants all seemed to have forgotten the side of the
333. In two previous articles, I have detailed support for this argument. See Rich, supra note 318, at
188-99; William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to
Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 272-82 (2001).
334. See supra text accompanying note 306.
335. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 76 (1997) (blaming the Supreme Court for "annihilat[ing]" the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause that established the preeminence of rights
derived from federal law.
A new century comes with a new focus. As explained in the pages which
follow, five Supreme Court justices have revived the argument that elements of
state sovereignty survive even within the sphere of preeminent federal power.
Four dissenting justices have consistently refused to accept the fundamentally
incoherent conception of state sovereign immunity championed by the majority.
All of the justices appear to accept the understanding that, within its proper
sphere, the Fourteenth Amendment overrides the Eleventh Amendment and
pierces any existing claims to immunity. None of the justices, however, have yet
been asked to consider whether rights derived from federal statutes constitute
"privileges or immunities of Citizens of the United States," and therefore warrant
preeminent status.336
A. Supreme Court Revisionism
This account of Supreme Court resurrection of state sovereign immunity
within the sphere of enumerated national powers begins with the 1996 decision
that Congress had no power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by authorizing
private individuals to enforce federal statutory rights against states.3 37 The
question asked by the Court in the Seminole Tribe case has special significance
when viewed from a nineteenth century perspective. In his majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist asked: "Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a
constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate? '338 The
question directly parallels the lament voiced by Congressman Bingham and
others when promulgating the Fourteenth Amendment. As Bingham noted,
despite explicit constitutional text reinforced by the Supremacy Clause, a "body
of great and patriotic men looked in vain for any grant of power" that would
provide "protection by national law from unconstitutional State enactments" such
as the South Carolina defiance of federal tariffs.
3 39
After asking the question, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides "authority to abrogate" the Eleventh
Amendment.34 ° In the context of discussing enforcement of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, however, none of the parties analyzed the question of how
broadly the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority should be
construed.34'
336. See Rich, Privileges or Immunities, supra note 333, at 304.
337. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
338. Id. at 59.
339. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2543 (1866). See discussion supra text accompanying note
306.
340. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
341. The Chief Justice cites the lack of federal question jurisdiction as an explanation for why Congress
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis relies heavily upon the Supreme Court
decision in Hans v. Louisiana.342 He dismisses the dissenters' explanations of
Hans as "undocumented and highly speculative." 343 While purporting to rely
upon "fundamental 'jurisprudence in all civilized nations," ''344  however,
Rehnquist ignores the basic distinction between Hans and other cases asserting
federal question jurisdiction. As Justice Stevens explains, the Hans dispute arose
out of state contract law.345 The "fundamental jurisprudence" that supports a
continuation of state sovereignty in the context of contract disputes also supports
the exclusive and preeminent national authority over federal questions that do not
arise out of state law.346
In a series of subsequent cases, the Supreme Court majority, referred to in
recent literature as the "gang of five, 34 7 cling to a doctrine of state sovereign
immunity that clashes with the framers' fundamental conception of sovereign
did not use broader language when it originally promulgated the Eleventh Amendment, concluding that "it
seems unlikely that much thought was given to the prospect of federal question jurisdiction over the States." Id.
at 70. He then ignores implications of the decision by Congress to add federal question jurisdiction to the
arsenal of the federal courts in 1875, shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (noting
parenthetically that federal courts would not have federal question jurisdiction until 1875, but ignoring the link
between that expansion and enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment).
342. Id. at 64 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 34 U.S. 1 (1890)).
343. Id. at 68-69.
344. Id. at 69.
345. Id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 116-30 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining reasons
for not relying upon the rationale in Hans).
346. Note that, as Justice Stevens explained, the Court in Hans "expressly pointed out.., that an
individual who could show that he had an enforceable contract under state law would not be barred from
bringing suit in federal court to prevent the State from impairing it." Id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As in
Chisholm, the plaintiff in Hans sought to enforce a contract obligation against the state. The only significant
difference between the cases is that in Hans the plaintiff relied upon a federal source, the Contracts Clause of
Article I, Section 10, rather than merely resting on federal diversity jurisdiction as the basis for his claim. The
essence of the claim, that the state must pay its contract debts, remained the same in both cases. As a result,
Justice Bradley correctly understood that allowing the plaintiff to proceed in Hans would have, for all practical
purposes, overruled Chisholm. Justice Brennan also made this point in his decision for the Supreme Court in
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (concluding
that Alabama had waived claims to sovereign immunity by directly participating in interstate commerce), and
again in his dissenting opinion in Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri v.
Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 317-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The error in Hans, therefore, was neither the Court's conclusion nor its underlying sense that the United
States Constitution did not empower citizens to bring actions for monetary damages in order to enforce contract
rights against states. The Hans Court erred only with its use of broad language which allowed for the
implication that no suits may be brought against states whether or not based upon underlying claims that fall
with the realm of historic state sovereignty. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15-16. The Court should have simply
declared that questions about enforceability of contracts with states were initially to be resolved in state courts
pursuant to state law and could not be brought directly under the Contract Clause of Article I; Mr. Hans
therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted by a federal court. For additional analysis of
these issues, see Amar, supra note 17, at 1472 (noting the argument that a state's "'sovereign' immunity
was ... exactly coextensive with her derivative 'sovereign' lawmaking capacity").
347. John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091 (2000) (comparing the current Supreme Court majority with the justices who
dominated the Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
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power. In three cases, the Court deals explicitly with the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress authority to over-ride Eleventh
Amendment constraints,348 and in all three cases they recognize that authority.349
In those three cases, however, the five justices in the majority rejected
application of congressional authority to the cases at hand.
In the first case, involving claims that states violated the Due Process Clause
when they violated individual patent rights, the Court concluded that, absent a
history of state abuse of patent rights, due process considerations could not be
stretched to encompass state violations.35 ° In the other two cases, the Court found
that, although both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act addressed problems of discrimination against the
elderly and those with disabilities, the Equal Protection Clause could not be
interpreted as authority to address those concerns.35' In all three cases, the
Supreme Court concluded that the congressional acts were not congruent and
proportional to the interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as
established by the Court itself.352 In all three cases, the majority also emphasized
that powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution were limited by Eleventh
Amendment constraints.
In yet another case, Alden v. Maine,353 the Court blocked claims brought in
state court against state agencies for monetary damages owed for violations of
federal statutes authorized by Article I. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
asserted that States "retain 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,' 354 without
explaining how that element of sovereignty extends within the sphere of
enumerated national powers. Again, the Court was not presented with arguments
that the federal right in question should be considered a "privilege or immunity
of citizens of the United States," and again all parties ignored the nineteenth
century background of that text.
Evidence relied upon by the majority, when scrutinized, not only fails to
support their argument, but in a more fundamental sense demonstrates that, prior
to the era of John C. Calhoun, government leaders understood sovereignty in
348. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (rejecting abrogation provided
by the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (concluding that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not provide authority for abrogating the Eleventh Amendment);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that a patent
statute explicitly abrogating state immunity could not be justified as derived from congressional authority under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
349. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637.
350. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640.
351. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
352. In City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), the Supreme Court narrowed the authority of
Congress to enact laws to remedy violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protecting rights deemed "congruent and proportional" to Supreme Court interpretations of that Clause.
353. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (barring individual claims for monetary damages against state agencies to
enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act).
354. Id. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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exclusive terms that contradict the Court's conclusions. For example, to establish
textual support for their position, the majority points to the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments.355 In making this reference, however, the majority ignores the
classic principle explained to a prior generation of aggressive justices by Justice
Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." 356 The text of both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the
Constitution corresponds with and reinforces the view of sovereignty identified
by Justice Holmes. The Tenth Amendment limited authority "reserved to the
States" to those "powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution. '" 357 As Justice Souter has explained, no one argued at the time when
the issue first arose that "the Tenth Amendment had been understood to give
federal constitutional status to state sovereign immunity.
Writing for the majority in Alden, Justice Kennedy also relied upon the
commentaries of Blackstone, described as "the preeminent authority on English
law for the founding generation. ' '359 But even if one were to accept Kennedy's
account of Blackstone's link between sovereignty and immunity-a link that
Justice Souter persuasively rejects36°0the view that state immunity persists in
the context of national legislation remains fundamentally incoherent. Thus,
Kennedy quotes Blackstone as equating "sovereignty" with "preeminence. 361
But Kennedy and his colleagues in the majority never explain how state
"preeminence" could survive a constitutional plan which gave Congress
enumerated powers and then provided that "the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.,
362
In other words, state sovereignty, as explained in the language of Blackstone,
could not coexist within the context of sovereign congressional authority. Justice
Kennedy skips from quoting Blackstone to "the doctrine that a sovereign could
not be sued without its consent' '363 without ever explaining how states could be
considered "sovereign"-as that term was understood by Blackstone and
others-with respect to the exercise of powers given to the national government.
None of the framers articulated that perspective.
355. See, e.g., id. at 712-13.
356. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). For discussion, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 795-
98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
357. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
358. Alden, 527 U.S. at 781 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting a lack of reference to the Tenth Amendment
in Chisholm).
359. Id. at 715.
360. Id. at 764-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 715.
362. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
363. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
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The theory that states did not surrender a piece of their sovereign immunity
from suits for damages brought by private individuals when they agreed to be
bound by the Constitution rests upon a conception of the Constitution as a
"compact among the states" rather than as an agreement reached by the people of
a unified nation. 364 In that sense, the current majority's approach parallels prior
explanations for why the federal government lacked power to enforce its laws
against South Carolina's exclusion of black seamen from Charleston Harbor:
Attorney General Roger Taney believed that "slave holding states could not have
surrendered this power" 365 and the South Carolina Association claimed that "a
sovereign state cannot surrender a right of vital importance ... she is herself the
sovereign judge."366 Subsequent states' rights advocates, including five justices
on the current Supreme Court, argue that states would not have agreed to
constraints upon their sovereignty. They show little regard for the counterpoint,
explained by Webster367 and amplified by contemporary scholars,368 that ultimate
national sovereignty is derived from the people of the union rather from the
people within each state.
In another significant sense, the current majority's insistence that the
Eleventh Amendment embodies the "spirit" of state sovereign immunity violates
a cardinal rule of conservative jurists. Much as Calhoun and his cohorts broke
from the "strict construction" tenets that had previously characterized states'
rights advocates, 369 the Chief Justice and other members of the current majority
have turned their backs on the same principle.37°
Furthermore, the Court's decisions have produced the precise impact warned
against by Daniel Webster. We now have "one rule or one law for South
Carolina, and another for other States ' 371 that make themselves amenable to
claims for violations of federal law. While Webster argued that "people of the
364. See, for example, Justice Kennedy's statement in Alden v. Maine that "[a]lthough the Constitution
begins with the principle that sovereignty rests with the people, it does not follow that the National Government
becomes the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the people's will." Id. at 759. Justice Kennedy's
statement leaves open the question of how the people decide that states must comply with federal law or face
the prospect of paying monetary damages to those who suffer from violations of that law.
365. SWISHER, supra note 91, at 380. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
366. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366). See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 75-76.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
368. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 13, at 1628; Amar, supra note 17, at 1451-66.
369. See supra text accompanying note 161.
370. As explained repeatedly by the Court: "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not
so much for what it says, but for the presupposition.., which it confirms." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). For
criticism of the Court's approach, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 151-52 (2002) (explaining that "[tihe claim that the sovereignty of the states is
constitutional rests on an audacious addition to the eleventh amendment, a pretense that it incorporates the idea
of state sovereignty") and Donald H. Snook, Comment: Preserving Federalism or Perverting Constitutional
Principles: A Conservative Critique of the Conservative Majority, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 385 (2003).
371. GREAT DEBATE, supra note 40, at 280.
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United States are one people" for purposes of regulating commerce,372 federal
statutory rights now vary based upon individual state decisions to allow
enforcement of one or more federal statutory schemes.3 73
B. Returning to Charleston Harbor
Nineteenth century conflicts echo in the current Supreme Court's response to
a refusal by the South Carolina Ports Authority to allow the cruise ship Tropic
Sea a berth at Charleston Harbor. In 2002, the Supreme Court blocked owners of
the Tropic Sea from pursuing their complaint against the South Carolina Ports
Authority before the Federal Maritime Commission.374 Speaking in this case
through Justice Thomas, the majority again relied upon a conception of sovereign
immunity that can be traced to John C. Calhoun and the nullification doctrine.375
South Carolina's reason for refusing berthing space to the Tropic Sea may be
compared to that state's nineteenth century reasons for defying federal law. 37 6 In
both cases, navigation in and out of Charleston Harbor had the possibility of
undermining state domestic policy. In the current context, South Carolina
objected to allowing passengers to participate in gambling activities. At least
some of the Tropic Sea cruises would never dock at a different port; passengers
would board in Charleston and be allowed to gamble until they departed at the
same dock.377 South Carolina authorities sought to advance the domestic policy
of their state by blocking such use of their port.
Owners of the Tropic Sea argued that the Ports Authority's anti-gambling
policy violated the Shipping Act of 1984.378 They did not dispute the state's right
to adopt such policies, but rather claimed that South Carolina had implemented
its policy in a discriminatory manner by allowing Carnival Cruise Lines vessels,
which also offered on-board gambling activities, to use the port while repeatedly
barring comparable access to the Tropic Sea.
3 79
372. Id. at 287.
373. For example, Minnesota enacted a statute explicitly waiving some Eleventh Amendment immunity.
MINN. STAT. § 1.05 (2003). For a description of the patchwork of immunity provisions affecting state
employees in various states, see Millina Taddesse Tamrat, Note, Sovereign Immunity Under the Eleventh
Amendment: Kimel and Garrett, What Next for State Employees?, 11 ELDER L.J. 171 (2003).
374. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
376. Although it would be a mistake to equate slavery with the subject matter of contemporary disputes,
an underlying consistent attitude towards property rights and government regulation links Calhoun's promotion
of slavery (see supra note 239) to Campbell's arguments for property rights in Slaughter-House (see supra text
accompanying notes 317-18) and the recent Supreme Court decisions blocking the rights of aged workers (see
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62), disabled workers (see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356) and the "fair labor" rights of workers
generally (see Alden, 527 U.S. at 706).
377. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 747.
378. Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (codified at 46 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1701-1719 (West. Supp. 2004)).
379. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 748.
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None of the parties contested the federal Article I authority to regulate
shipping. Federal law provides that "no marine terminal operator may give any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage or impose any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to any person.,, 380 The South
Carolina Ports Authority was bound by law to adhere to this provision, and
Congress had specifically authorized private parties to initiate violation
complaints by filing claims with the Federal Maritime Commission. The question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether South Carolina's claims to
sovereignty exempted the Ports Authority from having to follow the
congressionally mandated procedure of responding to a private complaint. By
denying the right of private parties to bring such actions, the Court places
individuals at the mercy of federal discretionary authority in a manner that
replicates historical experience. In parallel terms, we may question whether
Attorney General John Ashcroft would have been more likely to initiate action on
behalf of the gambling cruises of the Tropic Sea than Attorney General Roger
Taney was to protect African Americans arriving in Charleston Harbor.1
8
'
The right of equal access to ports rests upon deep historical roots. The
Supreme Court faced the same underlying issue in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden.382 Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Johnson both answered the question
of whether states had authority to block ships licensed by the federal government
from docking in their ports. In Gibbons, Marshall looked to the federal law and
explained that:
[Steam boats were] entitled to the same privileges [as vessels using
sails], and can no more be restrained from navigating waters, and
entering ports which are free to such vessels, than if they were wafted on
their voyage by the winds, instead of being propelled by the agency of
fire .... The act of a State inhibiting the use of either [waters or port] to
any vessel having a license under the act of Congress, comes, we think,
383in direct collision with that act.
Justice Johnson took an even stronger position, rejecting any conceivable claims
to state sovereignty over matters included within the enumerated powers of
Congress. He explained that the power to regulate commerce "can reside but in
one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject,
leaving nothing for the State to act upon.""38 State statutes limiting access to the
380. 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 1709(d)(4) (West Supp. 2004).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
382. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
383. Id. at 221.
384. Id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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ports "dropped lifeless from their statute books, for want of the sustaining power,
that had been relinquished to Congress. 385
The opinions of Marshall and Johnson did not address the question of
whether a port authority could be sued for damages, either in federal court or
before a federal agency, for failing to abide by federal law. They do, however,
provide a backdrop for understanding the conception of sovereignty that existed
in the early years of our nation's history. The repeated point is that modern
notions of concurrent sovereignty had not yet been developed.386 The prevailing
view was that the transfer of sovereignty to the United States government
eliminated competing claims to state sovereignty. Prior to battles over access to
Charleston Harbor, no credible claims were made that state sovereignty could
trump the exercise of federal power authorized by Article I of the Constitution.
Defenders of slavery challenged the views of sovereignty that prevailed at
the time of Gibbons v. Ogden. As Attorney General, Roger Taney had
acknowledged that "judging by the past" the South Carolina laws that interfered
with recognized federal authority would be declared "null and void. 387 Harry
Elkison may have had federal law on his side, but in absence of support from the
United States Department of Justice, he lacked a forum in which to enforce
federal law. In Taney's opinion of 1832, the right of slave states to guard
themselves against free blacks among their slaves was a right that had not been
surrendered by the adoption of the United States Constitution, and therefore
could not be abrogated by federal law.388
Current justices acknowledge ultimate federal authority to enforce national
laws, while Calhoun would have denied even that right. For owners of the Tropic
Sea, however, this is a distinction without a difference. The first half of the
nineteenth century is replete with incidents involving theoretical federal power
confounded by the lack of enforcement. Thus, Harry Elkison languished in the
Charleston jail solely because Congress had not granted habeas corpus
jurisdiction to the federal courts. 3 89 For want of an effective individual right to
bring a claim against the state, South Carolina continued to defy conflicting
national laws.39°
385. Id. at 226.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 13-41.
387. SWISHER, supra note 91, at 381. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
388. CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 153 (1961).
389. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366) (concluding that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction to provide relief). Note that, within the broader context of assuring that
individuals would have access to federal courts to challenge unlawful state actions, Congress expanded the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts in 1867. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF HABEAS CORPUS 189-92 (1980).
390. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
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Although beaten back by the Civil War and by the constitutional amendments
designed to eliminate such arguments, the essential elements of the South Carolina
Doctrine have risen like the phoenix in the guise of "state sovereign immunity."
Louise Weinberg refers to recent Supreme Court opinions as "Calhoun's ghost,
' 391
stirring the image of John C. Calhoun smiling from the grave as the current South
Carolinian on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, declares
that sovereign immunity rights could not have been surrendered to Congress by the
plan of the Constitution, and therefore states could not be required to respond to
individual complaints filed with federal agencies.392
Arguments of the South Carolina Ports Authority follow the same themes
that were initially raised in the same port in the 1820's. In both contexts, the state
argued that it should not have to respond to individual complaints that its laws
conflict with federal rules banning discrimination in access to ports. On the other
side, the Tropic Sea's "right to navigate" parallels the claim described by Justice
Johnson when he denounced South Carolina's defiance of federal law in 1823.393
It is also the same "right to use the navigable waters of the United States"
reaffirmed by Justice Miller in his illustration of federal privileges or immunities
fifty years later.394
But in the century following Justice Miller's opinion, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause virtually disappeared from the "constitutional canon.
Furthermore, as one commentator recently noted, the "right to use the navigable
waters of the United States" and the "rights secured to our citizens by treaties
with foreign nations" have become "obscure and practically irrelevant." 396 In
other words, we have forgotten the events that gave rise to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Out of that neglect, the Supreme Court has fashioned a theory of
federalism that clashes with both constitutional history and text.
C. Opening the (Wrong) Door
In the course of developing its current doctrine of state sovereign immunity,
the Supreme Court has steadily arrogated more and more law-making authority.
No prior Court has so frequently and so consistently invalidated the actions of
Congress. In 2003, however, the Court appeared to retreat, at least slightly, from
its stranglehold on congressional authority to exercise its power under section
391. Weinberg, supra note 19, at 1156. See also Nowak, supra note 347 (linking current Supreme Court
doctrine to southern states' rights arguments); David Milton Whalen, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth
Justice: State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Environmental Law after June 23, 1999, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 193 (1999) (agreeing that recent Supreme Court decisions resurrect Calhoun's conception of state
nullification).
392. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002).
393. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (C.C.D,S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).
394. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
395. See Rich, supra note 318.
396. Newsom, supra note 313, at 687.
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five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court determined in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs397 that Congress has authority under
the Equal Protection Clause to enact the Family and Maternity Leave Act. The
majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, leaves the door ajar for a
limited congressional role in broadening federal protection for victims of
discrimination. In the process, however, in order to distinguish prior cases
involving age discrimination or discrimination against the disabled, Rehnquist
effectively imposed the rigid, three-tiered framework of Equal Protection
analysis398 on congressional efforts to secure fairness in the workplace.
The framework built by the Supreme Court to address issues of congressional
power to abrogate the Fourteenth Amendment rests upon a flawed foundation.
Thus, the historical reason for treating gender discrimination differently from age
discrimination or discrimination against the disabled is not the lack of a history
of invidious discrimination against the latter, or the relative need for legislative
protection. 399 The reason for treating the two issues differently when it comes to
judicial enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause is rather based on the
recognized need to provide more latitude to legislatures to address the relatively
complex issues of age and disability.40 0 The Court makes a fundamental mistake
by treating the need for legislative flexibility as a basis for blocking Congress
from using its Fourteenth Amendment authority to abrogate state immunity.
The Hibbs decision illustrates the point that courts, rather than Congress,
now decide whether to protect individuals from state violations of federal law.
No justices questioned the authority of Congress to address issues of fairness in
the workplace; states continue to face a "legal" obligation to comply with the full
range of federal laws addressing such issues. Workers protected by the federal
law theoretically retain all of the "privileges" encompassed by those laws. The
Supreme Court, however, uses its rigid equal protection categories to determine
in freakish fashion who will and who will not have authority to invoke the
397. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
398. See 2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 25.02,
25.03 (2d ed. 1997).
399. When the Supreme Court initially distinguished age discrimination from race discrimination, it
cited the differences in historical treatment as a basis for giving less scrutiny to lines drawn on the basis of age.
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). The more significant problem faced by the Court in that
context, however, was its lack of a bright line that could be used to identify "a class defined as the aged," id. at
314, or to establish "need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process."' Id. at 313. The justices
declared that "[w]e do not make light of the substantial economic and psychological effects premature and
compulsory retirement can have on an individual," id. at 316, but nevertheless chose to give the legislature
broad scope for assessing complex issues of aging. See id. at 314-15, n.7 (explaining studies that resulted in
varied Massachusetts retirement ages).
400. In simplest terms, no recognizable dividing line distinguishes "the elderly" or "the disabled," and in
that sense those categories remain arguably different from discrimination based upon race, gender, legitimacy or
alien status. Because of this difference, it may be legitimate for the Court to defer more to the legislature when
the legislature addresses issues of age or disability. That is not an acceptable reason, however, for blocking
Congress from protecting elderly or disabled state employees while allowing Congress to impose financial
liability on states that do not comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act.
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remedial scheme that Congress constructed. We have entered the realm of
government by judiciary, with no reasonable principles to guide that process or to
support predictions of the scope of rights that Congress will be allowed to
protect.
401
In all of the recent cases regarding congressional authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, the focus of attention has been limited to the Supreme
Court's role in interpreting the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection
Clause. None of the cases have given serious attention to the potential scope of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. When understood in its historical context,
particularly in relation to the events that took place at Charleston Harbor and that
gave rise to the perceived need for expanding federal power, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause will be seen as a resource for leading us out of the morass
created by recent Supreme Court decisions. It will also be seen as a key
component of a workable, contemporary conception of federalism consistent with
constitutional text, historical precedent and twenty-first century democratic
values.
D. Framework for Federalism
The lessons of Charleston Harbor provide an alternative framework for
conceptualizing state and federal relationships. This alternative builds on the
understanding that Webster won his debates with Hayne and Calhoun, that Roger
Taney erred when he found a lack of congressional power to enforce federal law
in the port of Charleston, and that the Fourteenth Amendment confirmed these
judgments. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was recognized at the time of its
enactment as the primary vehicle for reestablishing federal supremacy, thereby
invigorating "a primitive and essential power of the Constitution.'
40 2
One element of this framework emerged in the Supreme Court's only recent
consideration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In the case of Saenz v.
Roe40 3 the Court recognized the right to travel and thereby "become a citizen of
any State of the Union ... with the same rights as other citizens of that State."
With that holding, the Court resurrected an important element of Justice Miller's
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases.4°
401. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity
and the Rehnquist Court, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (2000) (asking why higher value should be placed
on protecting state treasuries than on providing a remedy for victims of unlawful state action).
402. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1058 (1866) (quoting Congressman Kelly, speaking in support
of the Fourteenth Amendment). See discussion supra text accompanying notes 280-306.
403. 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating California statute imposing durational residency requirement on
TANF recipients).
404. See id. at 503 (quoting Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 80).
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In his dissenting opinion in Saenz, Justice Thomas highlighted a pivotal point
of disagreement regarding the scope and significance of the Slaughter-House
framework. In a footnote he reinforced popular perceptions, commenting that
"[1]egal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause does not
mean what the Court said it meant in 18 7 3 . "405 In the text, however, Thomas
quoted Justice Miller's opinion, claiming that:
The Court declined to specify the privileges or immunities that fell into
this latter category, but it made clear that few did. See [Slaughter-House,
83 U.S.] at 76 (stating that "nearly every civil right for the establishment
and protection of which organized government is instituted," including
"those rights which are fundamental," are not protected by the Clause).
40 6
By taking Justice Miller's comment out of context, Thomas gives it a meaning
that coincides with historical myths but is antithetical to the statement that Miller
actually made.
It is accurate to say that Miller described the "privileges and immunities of
citizens of the States" in the broad language that Justice Thomas quoted. By
doing so, however, he did not "make clear" that little remained in the category of
rights "belonging to a citizen of the United States as such. 4 °7 Explicitly negating
that inference, Miller explains: "[L]est it should be said that no such privileges
and immunities are to be found if those we have been considering are excluded,
we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws., 40 8 In subsequent
paragraphs, Miller explains that "for all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was established, we are one people, with one common country, we
are all citizens of the United States. "409 Specific examples he gives include
references drawn both from the Bill of Rights and from Article I of the
Constitution.410 In spite of all that has been said over the years to malign Justice
Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House, the text of that opinion provides grounds
for a robust interpretation of privileges or immunities.
The understanding that references to "privileges" and "immunities" should
be broadly construed to include rights established by federal statute may be
gleaned from the reference that Justice Thomas relies upon. Thus, in the
quotation that Thomas selected from Miller's opinion, the Court makes it clear
that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" were understood to include both
"fundamental" rights and rights established through positive law. In 1868, the
405. Id. at 522 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
407. Id.
408. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79.
409. Id. (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867)) (emphasis in original).
410. Id. at 79-80. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 323-32.
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Supreme Court emphasized the latter by limiting the scope of the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause to those rights "common to the citizens in the
latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens.
4 1 1
With this language, the Court had both disavowed an independent role in creating
"privileges" or "immunities," while also explaining that those terms embraced
both constitutional and statutory rights.
Lest there be any confusion about this point, Congress also established in
unequivocal terms that rights derived from federal statutes were protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress enacted
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, and modified that Act in 1874, as an explicit
exercise of its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
text, which eventually became 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protects United States citizens
from deprivation of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the federal government.41 2 Treatises from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries acknowledged this scope.413 When
Professor D.O. McGovney wrote his celebrated article summarizing privileges or
immunities doctrine, he paraphrased the Fourteenth Amendment to read: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privilege or
immunity conferred by this Constitution, the statutes or treaties of the United
States upon any person who is a citizen of the United States. 414 Even the
contemporary United States Supreme Court majority acknowledges that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 encompasses federal statutory rights. 4 15
The Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of state sovereign immunity
within the context of powers ceded to the federal government revive the spirit of state
nullification. Obviously, the principles are distinct since the current Court leaves the
door open for potential enforcement of federal statutes. States continue to be
technically bound by the federal laws in question; direct enforcement by the federal
government as well as individual actions for injunctive relief against state officials
continue to be viable remedies for violations.41 6 In many contexts, however, these
411. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (concluding that corporations from one state did not have
inherent rights to do business in another state without obtaining an appropriate license to do so).
412. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, sec. 1, § 1979, Rev. Stat. 347 (1874) (emphasis added).
413. See Rich, supra note 318, at 193 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245 (1880); HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON
THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 64 (1901)).
414. D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219,
220 (1918). McGovney's article was reprinted twenty years later by the Association of American Law Schools,
recognizing it as one of a collection of essays considered to have "permanent value." 1 ASS'N OF AM. LAW
SCH., SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (1938). For discussion, see Rich, supra note 318, at 194.
415. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (concluding that
rights derived from the National Labor Relations Act were protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 (1980) (enforcing welfare rights derived from the Social Security Act).
416. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
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alternatives may be meaningless. 417 By eliminating individual claims for monetary
damages, the Court appears, in Justice Johnson's terms, "as much influenced by the
Pleasure of bringing [federal] Functionaries into contempt by exposing their
impotence as by any other consideration whatever. ''4 18 As Daniel Webster warned,
allowing states to violate federal law with apparent impunity, means that individual
rights will "depend on State opinion and State discretion," thereby defeating "the
main design for which the whole Constitution was framed. ' ' 9
Before concluding that the Supreme Court has seriously breached the
constitutional framework established following the Civil War, however, it is
important to note that the Court has not yet been asked the right questions.
The answers given by the majority to the questions it has been asked fall
within legitimate boundaries of judicial discretion. Although the historical
footing for arguments that, in 1787, framers of the Constitution meant to preserve
state sovereign immunity in the context of federal question jurisdiction seems
weak, the lack of direct evidence on this issue may be seen as grounds for debate.
The Seminole Tribe decision and its progeny may, therefore, be defensible.
The majority's argument that congressional interpretation of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses must be "congruent and proportional" to judicial
interpretations of those clauses may also be justified.420 The difficulty with giving
Congress wide discretionary authority in this context stems from the basic
observation that Congress itself remains bound by the principles in question. For
example, giving Congress free reign to interpret the Free Exercise Clause creates
risks of upsetting the constitutional balance between Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause principles. The same dilemma must be faced in the context
of Equal Protection Clause principles. While one might reasonably argue that
Congress should have the authority to independently interpret the Equal
Protection Clause as long as it provides more, rather than less, protection to the
victims of discrimination, that argument becomes vulnerable when courts enforce
those principles to protect the majority as well as the minority. Again, as in the
context of the religion clauses, protection of individuals from government action
takes on dimensions of balancing rather than straightforward twisting of a
ratchet.42' We can disagree with the fact that the Supreme Court has transformed
417. As previously noted, this may well be a "distinction without a difference" for owners of the Tropic
Sea. See supra text accompanying note 388. As Justice Brennan explained, "in many situations, it is only
money damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause." Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,20 (1989).
418. See supra text accompanying note 83.
419. GREAT DEBATE, supra note 40, at 205. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
420. See Rich, supra note 318, at 229 (noting legitimacy of judicial supervision of due process and equal
protection principles).
421. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne v. Flores, the Court left the door open for
Congress to take a more protective stance in determining the scope of Fourteenth Amendment powers. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (defining a ratchet approach to measuring the scope of
congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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analysis of these issues into balancing tests, and we can challenge the balance
struck by the Court, while nevertheless conceding that it must ultimately be the
Court rather than Congress that strikes the balance. Therefore, when asked
whether the Equal Protection Clause empowers Congress to enact the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, it is
not unreasonable for the Court to conclude that the answer is "no."
The proper question, however, is whether federal statutory employment
rights should be recognized as "privileges or immunities" of United States
citizens. If asked that question, the Court's only reasonable answer should be
"yes." This is true because of history, because of shared understanding of text,
and because of precedent that may have been forgotten by many, and dropped by
scholars from the popular constitutional canon, but which nevertheless-until
overruled-retains its binding strength.422
In the context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court
should defer to Congress in much the same manner that it defers to congressional
authority to define the scope of interstate commerce. Three basic factors point in
this direction.
First, it should be noted that privileges or immunities as historically defined
must be derived from other powers of the central government. Those other
powers, like the Commerce Clause or the Property Clause, give rise to navigation
rights or homestead rights, both of which have been identified by the Supreme
423Court as belonging within the sphere of privileges or immunities. 42 Because
Congress has broad authority to decide how to exercise its Article I powers, that
authority should not be narrowed just because, when doing so, Congress issues
commands that are enforceable against the states. That was, after all, the basic
dispute between Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun, and the basic principle
established by the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution.424
Second, giving Congress responsibility for drawing the complex lines
involved with privileges or immunities is consistent with the principle that the
legislative branch should have authority to establish the positive law. Ironically,
the Supreme Court recognized and reinforced this principle in the precise context
of explaining why the Court should retain primary responsibility for determining
425the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Court has been looking
422. See Rich, supra note 318, at 227-32.
423. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79 (citing the "right to use the navigable waters of the United
States" as an example of privileges or immunities); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884)
(recognizing homestead rights on federal land as privileges or immunities).
424. Webster and Calhoun debated whether this was a unitary nation or a federation of contracting
states; whether ultimate sovereignty resided with the people of the nation or with the people within individual
states. See supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
425. In Garrett, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: "If special accommodations for the disabled are to
be required, they have to come from the positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause." Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). As implied by the Chief Justice, Congress has primary
responsibility for development of the positive law. The fact that such protection is derived from positive law,
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at the wrong clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when reviewing congressional
authority to enforce its laws against the states, it has been drawn into the
unseemly process of attempting to re-engineer the complex positive laws
regulating employment. Furthermore, advocates for federal rights have been
pressed to squeeze their arguments into boxes created by the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clauses when we all understand that the basic reason for authorizing
congressional action stems instead from its interest in consistent regulation of
commerce. We can ignore that sham and restore coherence to constitutional
doctrine by recognizing that employment rights, based upon Commerce Clause
authority, constitute "privileges" of United States citizens.
Finally, recognizing congressional authority to establish and enforce federal
rights against states when exercising its Article I powers will also help to restore
the democratic principles that the post-Civil War Constitution reinforced.4 26 The
reasons for not extending legislative control over the scope of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses disappear in the context of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Congress, not the Supreme Court, should have the democratic responsibility
of balancing the positive employment rights of individuals against the interests of the
states. While Calhoun and Hayne might disagree, fearing the power of the central
government that would emerge from such an exercise of authority, Webster would
counter that through such laws we become "one people." 27 In the twenty-first
century, we should acknowledge that Webster's arguments have prevailed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In spite of the insistence of a current Supreme Court majority, the doctrine of
state sovereignty which those justices espouse did not exist during the founding
generation. The justices fail to find historical support for their conception of state
immunity for the simple reason that state sovereignty within the context of a
valid exercise of federal power would have been unthinkable at that time.
Authors of the Eleventh Amendment were neither ignorant nor naive. They were
offended by federal court interference with the conception of state sovereignty
that existed at the time, and that would apply in the context of diversity
jurisdiction.428 But they never claimed state sovereign rights within the context of
valid federal authority.
however, is not a reason for discounting congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity. For
discussion, see Rich, supra note 318, at 222.
426. See FLETCHER, supra note 276, at 57. See generally discussion supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
427. See supra text accompanying note 238.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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The conception of sovereign immunity advanced by the majority did not
appear until it was raised in South Carolina in the 1820's. South Carolina leaders
believed that federal tariff policies and federal treaties threatened the institution
of slavery. In order to counter that threat, they needed a theory of state
sovereignty that would protect them from federal encroachment. In other words,
they needed to assure that states could independently establish the limits of
national law. Only then could they assure that the federal government would not
be able to take either direct or indirect action that would destroy the institution of
slavery.
All of the elements of contemporary conservative states' rights policy came
together for the first time in the South Carolina debates. Leading politicians were
free traders, opposing any form of government regulation whether emanating
from Congress or from their own state legislature. They were also undemocratic
and profoundly conservative. 429 Unlike their conservative, states' rights
predecessors, however, South Carolinians added two distinct elements to their
conception of federalism: First, state sovereignty survived the "plan of the
convention" and gave ultimate authority to the states to act even within the
sphere of enumerated national powers; and second, this claim to state sovereignty
over-rode prior conservative principles of strict construction.43°
John C. Calhoun and Robert Y. Hayne expressed their claims of ultimate
state sovereignty in some of the highest profile debates in the history of the
United States Senate; their views were backed by action, defying federal treaties
and law, bringing the nation to the brink of war in the 1830's, and finally
plunging the nation into Civil War. After the war, the nation embraced Daniel
Webster's conception of a consolidated union, President Lincoln restored that
national vision, and John Bingham led Congress to enact the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause to provide additional constitutional
enforcement of that principle. In subsequent years, Congress and the Supreme
Court reestablished the preeminence of rights, privileges or immunities based
upon federal law.
The current Supreme Court majority ignores that history, with arguments that
echo the views of Calhoun and Hayne, sounding themes that emerged in the
1820's and 1830's. The justices share the same profound conservatism of their
predecessors, including a dedication to principles of free trade and broadly based
opposition to government regulation of the economy. They also break from
conservative insistence on "strict construction" to claim that elements of state
sovereignty survived the "plan of the convention," and to entrench that claim
with constitutional status while disregarding constitutional text. No one in the
founding generation shared this combination of views.
429. See SINHA, supra note 45, at 25.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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In 2002, the Supreme Court blocked owners of the Tropic Sea from
enforcing their claims that South Carolina defied federal law by denying their
right of access to the port of Charleston. The Court rendered its decision without
reference to Charleston Harbor's history as the staging ground for nineteenth
century battles over federalism. No one asked whether a traditional "right to
navigate" includes a right to dock in state ports free from unlawful
discrimination, and no one cited Supreme Court precedent tying that right to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When lawyers
and judges finally ask the right questions, they will discover that constitutional
text and judicial precedent provide a way out of the undemocratic and incoherent
web of state sovereign immunity that the justices have spun.
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